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THE INVIOLATE HOME: HOUSING 
EXCEPTIONALISM IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Stephanie M. Stern† 
The ideal of the inviolate home dominates the Fourth Amendment. 
The case law accords stricter protection to residential search and 
seizure than to many other privacy incursions.  The focus on protection 
of the physical home has decreased doctrinal efficiency and coherence 
and derailed Fourth Amendment residential privacy from the core 
principle of intimate association.  This Article challenges Fourth 
Amendment housing exceptionalism.  Specifically, I critique two 
hallmarks of housing exceptionalism: first, the extension of protection 
to residential spaces unlikely to shelter intimate association or 
implicate other key privacy interests; and second, the prohibition of 
searches that impinge on core living spaces but do not harm 
interpersonal and domestic privacy.  Contrary to claims in the case law 
and commentary, there is little evidence to support the broad territorial 
conception of privacy inherent to the “sanctity of the home,” a vital 
personhood interest in the physical home, or even uniformly robust 
subjective privacy expectations in varying residential contexts. 
Similarly, closer examination of the political and historical rationales 
for housing exceptionalism reveals a nuanced, and equivocal, view of 
common justifications for privileging the home.  This Article advocates 
replacing the broad sweep of housing exceptionalism, and its emphasis 
on the physical home, with a narrower set of residential privacy 
interests that are more attentive to substantive privacy and intimate 
association. 
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AND EXPECTATIONS 
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INTRODUCTION 
The notions of the inviolate home and the paramount importance of 
constraining government search of the home are cherished tenets of 
constitutional law and scholarship.1  The constitutional solicitude and 
judicial rhetoric surrounding the home reflects the belief that residential 
privacy rights are both psychologically and politically vital.2  Assumptions 
about the psychological and political primacy of residential protection have 
pervaded Fourth Amendment case law and dominated criminal procedure 
 1 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 589–90 (1980); Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, 
and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 957 (1997) (“The 
most sacred of all areas protected by the Fourth Amendment is the home.”); James Q. Whitman, 
The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1215 (2004) 
(noting that American privacy law conceives of the home “as the primary defense”). 
 2 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 997–
1000 (1982) (advocating strong protection of the home from criminal searches because of 
residents’ strong personhood interests); see also Arianna Kennedy Kelly, The Costs of the Fourth 
Amendment: Home Searches and Takings Law, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (suggesting 
compensation for harms to personhood inherent in residential searches). 
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commentary without examination or challenge.3  This Article seeks to fill 
that void. 
Absent specified exceptions, criminal investigation of the home 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.  Without a warrant, 
such a search is presumptively unreasonable.4  In an era of narrowing 
privacy protection,5 privacy in residential search and seizure receives 
comparatively stronger protection than many other contexts, including 
commercial buildings, certain automobile searches, computer databases, 
and public places.  Indeed, at times the protection of privacy rights in the 
home has been so expansive as to appear absurd, with lawyers vigorously 
contesting whether suspects’ dog houses receive Fourth Amendment 
protection.6 
Historically, the strong protection accorded to the home derives in part 
from a property-based approach to identifying protected Fourth 
Amendment interests.  In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court 
declared that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places” and 
explicitly abandoned the property-based approach in favor of a standard 
that looks to reasonable expectations of privacy.7  As commentators have 
observed, however, the move from property to privacy has been 
incomplete, and traditional property concepts feature in some post-Katz 
cases.8  I contend that the move from property to privacy has been 
particularly (and perhaps paradigmatically) flawed in the area of residential 
search rights.  Katz may have signaled a retreat from reliance on property 
law in Fourth Amendment doctrine for nonresidential property, but not for 
 3 The sanctity of the home in criminal law parallels the enhanced protection accorded to 
the home in property, tax, and bankruptcy law.  See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential 
Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1099–1108 (2009). 
 4 Activities or possessions within the home are subject to unregulated search and seizure 
only when occupants expose them to the public eye or ear, in certain exigent circumstances, or 
when the evidence is in plain view of a lawful intrusion.  See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 
136–37 (1990). 
 5 See STEPHEN R. SADY, OFFICE OF THE FED. PUB. DEFENDER, DIST. OF OR., 
DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW 1–2 (2006), http://or.fd.org/Search and 
Seizure Sept 2006.pdf. 
 6 See Trimble v. State, 816 N.E.2d 83, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that defendant had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area encompassing the doghouse); Bess v. State, 636 
S.W.2d 9, 10 (Tex. App. 1982) (holding that warrant authorizing the search of a residence 
encompassed the dog house and other outbuildings).  In a similar vein, courts have scrutinized 
whether privacy protections extend to discarded garbage.  See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 
35, 37, 40–41 (1988) (holding that search of garbage left on or at the curb did not intrude upon 
reasonable expectations of privacy because the garbage was outside the protective curtilage of the 
home and readily accessible to the public); see also Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 125 (Wyo. 
1970) (holding that police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
warrantless searches when they instructed garbage collectors to give garbage to authorities for 
inspection after the collectors removed it from the backyard). 
7 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 8 Many scholars have discussed the property orientation of Fourth Amendment law with 
Orin Kerr’s account being one of the more recent.  See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and 
New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–
27 (2004) (discussing the persistence of property concepts in Fourth Amendment doctrine). 
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the home.  This property-oriented, and specifically home-focused, approach 
has produced residential protection that is at times too strong and too 
blunt.9  This does not mean that residential protection is absolute; rather it 
is comparatively stronger than many other search contexts and unduly 
focused on the physical home.  Housing exceptionalism has muddled 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with respect to residential property and 
more broadly as residential and nonresidential spaces have competed for 
Fourth Amendment protection. 
This Article challenges two hallmarks of housing exceptionalism. 
First, privileging the physical home has adulterated Fourth Amendment 
doctrine by extending the home’s expansive “umbrella” of Fourth 
Amendment protection beyond the relational and domestic core of 
residential spaces.10  This approach has contributed to the inefficient 
allocation of privacy protection relative to both individual harm and the 
societal interest in crime control.  Moreover, as the rhetoric of home 
protection strained criminal justice enforcement, other Fourth Amendment 
doctrines, such as publicity and the plain-view seizure doctrine, moved to 
the jurisprudential fore and further contorted privacy allocation.11  Second, 
within core domestic and relational spaces, many cases have afforded 
expansive, formalistic protection to the physical home rather than on the 
basis of substantive privacy interests and intimate association.  By 
substantive privacy, I refer to subjective intrusiveness and objective 
privacy harm from police action, not constitutional substantive due 
process.12 
Disturbingly, the (over)protection of the home has justified decisions 
extending less protection in other contexts.13  One reason offered by courts 
for extending less protection to privacy in nonresidential contexts is their 
 9 In United States v. Kyllo, 553 U.S. 27 (2001), the majority described the shift in search 
and seizure doctrine from the common law of trespass of property to the reasonable expectations 
of privacy test, but the majority also noted that in the case of the home “there is a ready criterion, 
with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is 
acknowledged to be reasonable.”  Id. at 34 (emphasis added and omitted); see also William C. 
Heffernan, Property, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 633, 637 (1994) 
(noting that “the Fourth Amendment offers independent protection for property interests, apart 
from privacy interests”). 
 10 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (describing the home’s “umbrella” 
of Fourth Amendment protection). 
 11 Christopher Slobogin describes how this dynamic interacts with the probable cause 
standard in general.  He observes that the probable cause standard “exerts enormous pressure on 
the courts to reduce the scope of the Fourth Amendment by narrowly defining ‘search’ and 
‘seizure.’”  CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK 29 (2007). 
 12 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (holding that “[i]n the home, . . . all details are intimate 
details”); Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300, 303 (broadly defining intimate activities to include “domestic 
life” and holding that an area is protected curtilage if it “harbors the intimate activity associated 
with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 13 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (“We find it 
important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy 
expectations are most heightened.”); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–92 (1985) (holding 
that the expectations of privacy are with regard to homes rather than automobiles). 
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dissimilarity to residential privacy interests.  In this way, residential search 
doctrine has indirectly facilitated precedents that limit protection in the 
more prevalent search contexts of vehicular search, stop and frisk, and 
public surveillance.14  This dynamic belies the popular intuition that 
protection for the home secures and fosters privacy protection as a general 
matter. 
Despite these costs, housing exceptionalism has thrived on the 
assumption that Fourth Amendment protection of the physical home 
effectively safeguards critical personal and political interests.15  
Psychological and historical evidence reveal a more complex and equivocal 
picture.  With respect to the psychological claims, there is little objective 
evidence that privacy is primarily a spatial or territorial concept or that 
individuals require the utmost protection from residential privacy 
incursions.  The empirical evidence also does not support strict protection 
of the physical home based on a personhood interest or the assumption that 
the home’s inviolacy is vital to identity and psychological flourishing. 
Even subjective expectations of privacy suggest a relative view of home 
privacy and call into question the privileging of all things residential. 
Citizens ascribe much greater intrusiveness to searches of bedrooms, for 
example, than searches of home garages, curbside residential garbage, or 
surveillance of backyards.16 
The political and historical necessity of housing exceptionalism also 
falters upon closer examination.  The claim that homes are uniquely 
vulnerable to police harassment and overreaching because they contain so 
much potential evidence is unconvincing—overreaching is a more 
troubling issue in computer and database searches than in residential ones.17  
Moreover, the way to protect against police overreaching in residential 
search is not through housing exceptionalism but by undoing or limiting the 
plain-view seizure doctrine.  Contrary to constitutional intuition, residential 
search protection does not provide citizens an effective haven from the 
reach of government.  Because enhanced protection of residential privacy 
rights has justified less protection, jurisprudentially and politically, in more 
prevalent contexts of search and seizure, housing exceptionalism has 
 14 See William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1016, 1062 & n.169 (1995). 
15 See infra Part II. 
 16 See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized 
and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738 tbl.1 (1993); see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal et 
al., The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 331, 355 tbl.1 (2009). 
17 See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 
2009) (en banc) (stating that magistrate judges should insist that the government waive reliance 
on the plain view doctrine when granting warrants to search computer hard drives or electronic 
storage); see also Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 319 (2008) (discussing various data-mining activities by federal 
agencies). 
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tended to increase government’s reach.  Within residential search, the 
doctrinal emphasis on the physical home (and privacy versus publicity) has 
diverted judicial attention from substantive privacy harm and left gaps in 
residential search protection.  Even the rationale of original intent, a 
constant in the Supreme Court’s holdings, is subject to challenge.  The 
historical record reveals a more complex view of the intentions of the 
Framers than the Court depicts.  In addition, as Tracey Maclin and other 
scholars observe, the concerns of those who lived in 1791 should not 
determine the meaning of the Fourth Amendment for our modern criminal 
justice system.18 
The iconic status of the home in American culture offers a lens 
through which to view the persistent privileging of the home in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.  The cultural ascendancy of the American home 
dates back at least to the Romantic philosophy of the home as a refuge 
from urban corruption.  The New Deal subsequently marketed this vision 
of the home as a civic virtue and the centerpiece of Depression-era reform. 
The long-standing cultural dominance of the home—not a territorial zone 
of privacy interests, the home’s special personhood nature, or the home as a 
haven against government—is a factor in housing exceptionalism’s 
persistence.  This cultural wellspring has produced laws privileging the 
home in multiple areas of law, including the Fourth Amendment. 
This Article seeks to disentangle the concepts of residential property 
and privacy and to identify the substantive interests at stake in different 
contexts of residential search.  A substantive privacy inquiry addresses the 
degree of intrusiveness and objective harm of the privacy invasion rather 
than property rights or residential boundaries.  In particular, I focus on the 
substantive interest in intimate association and argue that it is a dominant—
but not exclusive—interest in residential search.  In my view, this interest 
derives from the Fourth Amendment and specifically from the holding in 
Katz that the Fourth Amendment safeguards expectations of privacy in 
order to protect “people, not places.”19 
This approach to residential search seeks to unseat the icon of the 
physical home and replace it with a jurisprudence that is more responsive 
to the concerns of substantive privacy that animate residential settings. 
Some residential search contexts that presently receive protection are not 
likely to implicate substantial privacy harm.  For example, searches of 
certain areas adjacent to the home that are not used for domestic life and do 
 18 See Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth 
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 971 (2002); see also WILLIAM J. 
CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING, 602–1791, at 772 
(2009) (suggesting that the Framers could not “anticipat[e] the constitutional issues of later 
centuries”); LARRY YACKLE, REGULATORY RIGHTS: SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM, THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST, AND THE MAKING OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (2007) (arguing for instrumentalism in 
interpreting the Constitution as opposed to the “pretense that the 1789 document and its 
amendments actually supply answers to difficult questions”). 
19 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (emphasis added). 
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not impair the underlying interest in intimate association are likely to have 
a minimal impact on substantive privacy.  Similarly, technological scans 
that reveal only physical information such as heat and light merit less 
stringent protection than technology that risks chilling interaction and 
authenticity by exposing inhabitants’ interpersonal activities and private 
actions.  This analysis simplifies the seemingly controversial issue of 
government thermal scanning of homes addressed in the landmark case of 
Kyllo v. United States and suggests a lower standard of protection.20 
Before proceeding, I offer a few clarifications.  First, my arguments 
focus on the constitutional understanding of privacy—the focus of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence for the past half century.  I do not consider at 
length alternative grounds for protection, such as the rather vaguely 
conceptualized security interest in the Fourth Amendment21 or the risks of 
property destruction and violence attendant to residential search.  To the 
extent that psychological and political rationales are the operative 
justifications for privileging the physical home, I advocate reorienting the 
doctrinal focus from housing exceptionalism to substantive privacy and 
privacy of intimate association.  Second, my discussion primarily 
contemplates discrete instances of residential search,22 although I do 
consider institutional checks and legal safeguards for repeat searches.  Last, 
my focus is on housing exceptionalism and the relative protection of 
privacy rights in residential spaces.  Scholars debate whether Fourth 
Amendment protection should depend on the Katz test and the probable 
cause requirement for search or a sliding scale based on the strength of the 
government justification relative to the intrusiveness of the search.23  In 
light of these issues, I do not specify comprehensive, detailed standards for 
residential search.  Instead, I argue more generally that a residential 
investigation that does not harm interpersonal interests or other key privacy 
 
 20 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 21 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104–05 (2008) 
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment should protect security, not privacy, because the right to 
privacy does not address two central concerns of the Fourth Amendment: protection from 
government invasion and protection of liberty). 
 22 In the contexts of stop-and-frisk searches and vehicular stops, individual citizens who are 
subjected to a large number of intrusive searches are at a greater risk of psychological harm due 
to the ongoing loss of control and the inference that these practices signal a lack of societal 
respect toward them.  See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 15, 23–24 (2003) (exploring the notion of disrespect as the cause of anger in 
minority communities over search and seizure practices). 
 23 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 11, at 21–45.  Scholars also disagree about the amount of 
practical protection that warrants provide.  See Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable 
Cause: The Fourth Amendment’s Principled Protection of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 
589–93 (2008) (arguing that institutional competence, lack of resources, inadequate records of the 
probable cause finding, and lack of appellate review of probable cause findings undermine the 
protection that warrants provide); Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: 
Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1024–25 (1974) 
(observing that judges in warrant proceedings rely too heavily on counsel to raise issues and lack 
adequate administrative staff and resources). 
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interests may not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, or if it is a Fourth 
Amendment search, may not necessitate the high standard of probable 
cause. 
Part I of this Article explores the enshrinement of the physical home 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, often at the expense of substantive 
privacy and doctrinal efficiency.  Part II assesses the psychological 
evidence bearing on major rationales for privileging the physical home: the 
understanding of privacy as spatial exclusion, the personhood interest in the 
home, and subjective expectations of privacy.  Moving to political and 
constitutional justifications, Part III analyzes the claim that residential 
searches are uniquely vulnerable to government overreaching and critiques 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of original intent.  Part IV advocates 
replacing housing exceptionalism with a stronger, more consistent doctrinal 
focus on substantive privacy and privacy of intimate association.  I 
describe, through illustrative examples, how a substantive-privacy 
approach can address some of the pitfalls of housing exceptionalism.  Part 
V addresses objections to my account and considerations for revising the 
Fourth Amendment doctrine of residential privacy. 
I 
THE ICONIC HOME IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT  
Homes have achieved iconic status in the modern Fourth Amendment, 
with judicial rhetoric elevating residential search to the apex of protection.  
Doctrinally, homes receive greater protection than many contexts of search 
and seizure; only a few contexts, such as telephone booths and bodily 
invasion, receive greater protection.24  Courts and commentators justify 
stringent and expansive protection of the physical home based on the 
psychological primacy of privacy in the home and the home’s political and 
historical role as a haven from the reach of government.25  From the 
perspective of a cultural historian or property scholar, however, this 
persistent reverence is part of a broader cultural ascendance of the home 
across the last century—an ascendance that governmental actors and 
private business interests largely engineered.  The perseverance of this 
“cult of the home” in criminal search doctrine and rhetoric has inflicted 
significant damage on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  It has created an 
inefficient and anomalous pattern of protection within residential spaces 
and between residential spaces and other search contexts.  It has also 
justified, both politically and jurisprudentially, reducing protection in other 
search contexts. 
 
 24 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766–67 (1985) (intrusion into the body); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–53 (1967) (telephone booth); see also Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006). 
 25 See infra Part I.A. 
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A. Fourth Amendment Search: A Home-Centric Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court has defended the home as a sacred site at the 
“core of the Fourth Amendment.”26  Police may not physically intrude on a 
home, seize property within the home, or arrest a suspect in her home 
without a warrant.27  The warrant must issue based on a showing of 
probable cause and satisfy other procedural requirements or risk exclusion 
of the evidence at trial.28  In a jurisprudence focused on privacy versus 
publicity, the home is the quintessential private space.29  Indeed, the 
Court’s rhetoric (if not invariably its decisions) characterizes the “physical 
entry of the home [as] the chief evil against which the wording of the 
Fourth Amendment is directed.”30  Absent a specified exception, 
warrantless physical invasion of the home “by even a fraction of an inch” is 
constitutionally impermissible.31  A long line of Supreme Court precedent 
has proclaimed the sanctity of the home and its inviolability in language 
underscoring the home’s connotation with sacredness and religiosity.32 
 
 26 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999).  Scholars agree that the home site is 
jurisprudentially sacred.  See, e.g., Jones, supra note 1, at 957 (“The most sacred of all areas 
protected by the Fourth Amendment is the home.”); Kelly, supra note 2, at 7–8 (noting that the 
home has become the “gold standard” for Fourth Amendment protection). 
 27 See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 257, 257–59 (1984). 
 28 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary 
rule); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 1.1 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the origins and purposes of the exclusionary rule). 
 29 Cf. Jeannie Suk, Taking the Home, 20 LAW & LITERATURE 291, 299–309 (2008) 
(discussing the tension in law regarding the crossing of public and private in the home). 
 30 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
 31 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).  Residential protection in Fourth Amendment law has addressed not only 
traditional dwellings but also temporary dwellings, such as hotels and boarding places, and some 
nontraditional residences, such as long-term hospital rooms.  See, e.g., United States v. Gooch, 6 
F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1993) (“We have already established that a person can have an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent on private property.”); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 
1318, 1331–32 (9th Cir. 1985) (permitting legitimate law enforcement practices in a “migrant 
worker farm housing community” but holding that farm checks violate the Fourth Amendment).  
In Fourteenth Amendment cases, the protective shield of the home has extended so far as to 
legalize conduct within the privacy of the home that would otherwise be unlawful.  See Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding that a state statute criminalizing private possession of 
obscene materials may not “reach into the privacy of one’s own home”).  At the state level, the 
Alaska Supreme Court has extended constitutional protection to the personal consumption of 
marijuana in the home based on a right to privacy.  See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 503–04 
(Alaska 1975). 
 32 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (holding that warrantless searches 
and seizures inside a home are “presumptively unreasonable” (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 586 (1980))); Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment 
has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house . . . [and] that threshold may not reasonably be 
crossed without a warrant.” (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 590)); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 
705, 714 (1984) (“[P]rivate residences are places in which the individual normally expects 
privacy . . . and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as 
justifiable.”); United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 316 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting) 
(discussing inviolability of residential interiors).  As Linda McClain observes, the Court quite 
deliberately chose the word sacred, with its connotations of religiosity and inviolability, to 
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Not only has the Court rhetorically “drawn a firm line at the entrance 
to the house,”33 it has expansively defined the “home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth 
Amendment protection” to include outdoor curtilage and on occasion 
garages and garbage.34  The expansive reach of the home beyond core 
living spaces is one hallmark of Fourth Amendment housing 
exceptionalism.35  Curtilage is the outdoor property surrounding the home.  
It receives protection from physical entry and search (subject to some 
significant exceptions).36  Only at a remove from the home, in open fields, 
woods, or water, is the residence subject to police search without a 
warrant.37 
In the legal literature, criminal procedure scholars and privacy 
theorists almost invariably support stringent and expansive protection of 
the home.  Even the most ardent advocates of limiting privacy stop their 
assault at the threshold of the home and argue that residential privacy 
protection shelters actions that are legitimately exempt from government 
encroachment.38  The dominant assumption in criminal procedure 
scholarship seems to be that the home, and privacy within the home, is 
psychologically and politically important to individuals in a way, or to a 
degree, that privacy in other contexts is not.39  Recent work has gone so far 
as to consider whether Fourth Amendment home searches should be 
subject to a compensation requirement analogous to a government taking.40 
The draw of the home for courts and commentators—and of a 
formalistic, property-based approach to home protection—appears 
 
describe the home in constitutional jurisprudence.  Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: 
The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 202–06, 232–41 (1995). 
 33 Payton, 445 U.S. at 590. 
 34 See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (describing a four-factor test 
to determine if an area is within the home’s protected area); United States v. Whaley, 781 F.2d 
417, 420–21 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that entering residential property and seizing marijuana 
plants growing adjacent to the house violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 35 Courts do not, however, appear reluctant to deem an area an open field rather than 
curtilage.  This trend responds, as I shall discuss in Part IV, to an implicit recognition of the costs 
of the curtilage exception and the limited privacy interest in outdoor spaces. 
 36 See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300 (discussing the development of the curtilage exception).  A 
significant exception to curtilage protection is that the Court has allowed aerial surveillance of 
backyards so long as the airspace is generally accessible to the public.  See California v. Ciraolo, 
476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986). 
 37 See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
 38 See e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 196 (1999) (“[C]ontemporary 
American society largely exempts from scrutiny most acts that occur inside the home . . . .”). 
 39 James Whitman observes that Americans, unlike Europeans, “tend[] to imagine the home 
as the primary defense, and the state as the primary enemy.”  Whitman, supra note 1, at 1215; see 
also Radin, supra note 2, at 992 (“There is . . . the feeling that it would be an insult for the state to 
invade one’s home because it is the scene of one’s history and future, one’s life and growth.”).  In 
some instances, there appears to be an unspoken sentiment that privacy protection should be 
employed to mitigate the harshness or discriminatory character of substantive criminal law.  
While I am sympathetic to these concerns, utilizing privacy and search law as a safety valve for 
the criminal justice system not only detracts from an efficient and coherent body of privacy law 
but also diffuses the political will necessary for independent reform of criminal law. 
 40 See Kelly, supra note 2, at 35. 
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ineluctable.41  In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court 
declared that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”42  Prior 
to Katz, the Court premised search protection on property law concepts and 
employed the common law of trespass to discern when searches violated 
constitutionally protected areas.43  The test articulated in Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion in Katz is that government action rises to the level of a 
search when the person has “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” 
and “society is prepared to recognize [that expectation] as ‘reasonable.’”44  
As Katz and subsequent cases made clear, however, the expulsion of 
property from the province of Fourth Amendment protection was not 
complete.45  Reverence for the physical home tethered the Court to the 
property principles it had strived to abandon.  Lower courts heeded Justice 
Harlan’s explanation that determining reasonable expectations of privacy 
“requires reference to a ‘place,’” and in the case of the residential property, 
“a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy.”46  
A year later, the Court clarified the continuing dominance of the home by 
holding that Katz “was [not] intended to withdraw any of the protection 
which the Amendment extends to the home.”47 
In the 2001 landmark case of Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme 
Court further strengthened Fourth Amendment protection of the home.48  
Kyllo held unconstitutional a warrantless thermal scan of a home conducted 
from a public street, which indicated probable cause to suspect a 
marijuana-growing operation.49  The thermal scan recorded relative heat 
patterns and did not reveal other details of the occupants’ interactions or 
 
 41 See Kerr, supra note 8, at 814–27 (describing the property-based component of the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 42 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 43 See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–36 (1942) (“We hold that what 
was heard by the use of the detectaphone was not made illegal by trespass or unlawful entry.”); 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–66 (1928) (holding that a search does not violate 
an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights unless “there has been a search or seizure of his person, 
or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of 
his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure”). 
 44 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 45 Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the Limits of 
the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV. 889, 894 (2004) 
(“There has long been significant overlap between property rights and reasonable expectations of 
privacy.  Privacy is one of the things that people value about private property.”). 
 46 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 
1506, 1518 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Reed, 733 F.2d 492, 500–01 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 47 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180 (1969).  Subsequent cases, including those 
addressing warrantless arrest within the doorway of the suspect’s residence, affirmed the home as 
a dividing line between constitutional and unconstitutional police conduct.  See Kelly, supra note 
2, at 9 (“[The] seemingly magical quality of a home to confer immunity from warrantless arrest to 
a person as soon as he is inside does not seem to accord with Katz’s claim that the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment are for people rather than places.”). 
 48 533 U.S. 27, 37, 40 (2001). 
 49 See id. at 29–30, 40. 
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interpersonal activities.50  Drawing on the text and historical understanding 
of Fourth Amendment protection, Justice Antonin Scalia defended the 
interior of the home as the “prototypical . . . area of protected privacy.”51  
The majority opinion did, however, leave a substantial loophole that may 
ultimately erode home protection: it limited its holding to technology “not 
in general public use.”52  The dissenters recognized the constitutional 
preeminence of the home but disagreed with the majority because the 
thermal scan did not penetrate the interior of the home and only measured 
its exterior—an interest they thought paled against “‘the chief evil against 
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed,’ the ‘physical 
entry of the home.’”53 
The Kyllo case highlights another hallmark of housing exceptionalism: 
the reflexive protection of the home interior as a vital form of property or 
an all-encompassing symbol of domestic life.54  By virtue of their locus 
within the home, “all details are intimate details” no matter how mundane 
or technical.55  In Kyllo, and in a number of other Fourth Amendment 
precedents, intimacy derives from the residential status of property, not 
from a particularized analysis of the ex ante likelihood that a type of search 
will implicate substantive interests.56 
To be clear, home protection is not absolute and there are chinks in the 
doctrinal armor.  Housing exceptionalism describes the comparatively 
robust (and property-focused) protection of the home and the rhetoric 
surrounding residential intrusion; it does not presume total protection.  
Fourth Amendment residential search doctrine encompasses a variety of 
exceptions in tension with the Court’s protectionist rhetoric.  Many of these 
exceptions derive from property law and reveal the double-edged sword of 
housing exceptionalism’s property orientation.  For example, trespass has 
 
 50 See id. at 29–30. 
 51 Id. at 34. 
 52 Id. at 34; see also Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth 
Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 1393, 1413–14 (2002) (discussing the difficulties lower courts will face when applying the 
“not in general use” standard). 
 53 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41–42, 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. 
Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). 
 54 For a general overview of the problems of Fourth Amendment formalism, see Akhil Reed 
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759–61 (1994). 
 55 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (emphasis omitted); see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505, 512 (1961). 
 56 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (“[T]he 
centrally relevant consideration [to the curtilage determination is] whether the area in question is 
so intimately tied to the home itself . . . .”).  Fourth Amendment case law contrasts starkly with 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in its ready recognition and consistent application of the 
principle that “the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property 
rights.  The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life.”  Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: 
The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2009) (arguing that Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, rather than protecting intimate relationships, creates vulnerability). 
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influenced Fourth Amendment doctrines that permit undercover agents to 
acquire evidence from conversations or other activities in the defendant’s 
domicile and empower third-party cohabitants to consent to a residential 
search.57  Squatting on another’s property may nullify a person’s privacy 
rights.58  Other exceptions are based on safety, such as allowing protective 
sweeps of the home following arrest.59  The exception with the greatest 
impact, the plain-view seizure doctrine, enables the police to seize evidence 
when police observe the evidence without assistance from a place where 
they have a right to be, and they have probable cause to believe that the 
object is the fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of the crime.60 
Even with these doctrinal exceptions, homes receive comparatively 
stronger protection than, for example, searches of commercial buildings, 
certain automobile searches, computer databases and in some instances the 
internet, and public places.  The exceptions illustrate how the Court’s 
property focus and absolutist rhetoric creates internal inefficiency within 
residential search doctrine: formalistic protection breeds formalistic 
exceptions.  It may be the case that residential search doctrine has buckled 
under the force of its rhetoric and the steep costs to law enforcement of 
taking precedents strictly at their word.  In addition, the extreme 
protectionist language in many cases, coupled with other precedents 
carving out exceptions, increases decisional variance.  When deciding 
novel questions, the Court may extend the reach of exceptions, or, as in the 
Kyllo case, it may apply the sanctity of the home rhetoric to uphold strong 
residential protection. 
 
 57 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (holding that warrantless entry to 
search for drug evidence did not violate the Constitution even though the police reasonably but 
erroneously believed that the consenting third party possessed common authority over the 
premises); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding that defendant had no 
protected Fourth Amendment interest in information he voluntarily confided to a police informer 
while in the defendant’s hotel room). 
 58 See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1975) (“The [squatting] 
plaintiffs knew they had no colorable claim to occupy the land . . . .  That fact alone makes 
ludicrous any claim that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).  As another example, 
housing inspections are permissible subject to a warrant based on satisfaction of reasonable 
legislative or administrative standards for local inspection, not traditional probable cause.  See 
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (holding that probable cause to issue a warrant 
to inspect property for housing code violations “must exist if reasonable legislative or 
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied”). 
 59 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that a properly limited sweep 
incident to a lawful in-home arrest is permissible when police possess a reasonable belief based 
on specific and articulable facts that area harbors an individual posing danger). 
 60 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738–40 (1983) (establishing plain view doctrine in 
context of vehicular search); cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Privacy as Struggle, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
501, 507 (2007) (“[I]t is the home that seems to be the one place where the Court claims to be, 
and often is, granting privacy without requiring extraordinary efforts to see that what is said and 
done in the home stays in the home.”). 
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B. The Cult of the Home: The Fourth Amendment in Cultural 
Perspective 
The cultural and legal ascendance of the home across the twentieth 
century has encouraged the persistence of housing exceptionalism.  
Specifically, both the historical construction of the home as a sacred 
domestic sphere and the iconic cultural status of the home today have 
influenced constitutional doctrine.  This influence does not explain the 
genesis of Fourth Amendment residential protection in the Framing Era, 
but it is a factor (although not the exclusive one) in the persistence of 
doctrines privileging the physical home.61  In turn, constitutional and 
statutory laws have reinforced norms regarding the preeminent importance 
of the residential home to its occupants and to society.62 
The cultural dominance of the home dates to the late nineteenth-
century Romantic characterization of the home as a refuge from the 
corruption and danger of urban life.  Social historians have described how 
industrialization recreated the home as a “private place.”63  As early as 
1880, Vermont recognized a property right of residential “quiet occupancy 
and privacy.”64  Writing in 1896, Missouri Attorney General Herbert 
Spencer Hadley identified the “sanctity of the home” as well as the 
protection of private reputation as the key concerns of privacy.65  During 
this time, the American press and influential commentators, including 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, began to regularly cite the British 
maxim of “home as castle.”66 
 
 61 Other scholars have argued that Fourth Amendment protection derives from an 
inside/outside distinction with interior spaces protected at the expense of exteriors.  For an 
application of this theory to the internet, see Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the 
Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 22–25), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348322. 
 62 From this perspective, criminal law is unique not in its overattentiveness to the home—
that solicitousness is also a principal feature of property law, for example—but in the fact that it 
(rightly) does not differentiate protection on the basis of ownership versus rental or short-term 
occupancy.  See id. 
 63 See Tamera K. Hareven, The Home and Family in Historical Perspective, 58 SOC. RES. 
253, 259 (1991) (“Following the removal of the workplace from the home as a result of 
urbanization and industrialization, the household was recast as the family’s private retreat, and 
home emerged as a new concept and existence.”). 
 64 See Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of 
the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 632–33 n.59 (2002) (citing Newell v. Witcher, 53 Vt. 
589, 591 (1880)). 
 65 See H.S. Hadley, Can the Publication of a Libel Be Enjoined?, 4 NW. L. REV. 137, 145 
(1896).  Contemporaneously, journalists began to compare searches of homes to searches of the 
mail and telegraphs, a major privacy consternation of the nineteenth century.  See Telegrams in 
Court, N.Y. TRIB., Jan. 8, 1877, at 4; Trials of the Census-Taker, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1875, at 4.  
With respect to government search, Judge Thomas Cooley observed that “[the] maxim that ‘every 
man’s house is his castle’ is made a part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”  THOMAS M. COOLEY, 1 A TREATISE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF 
THE AMERICAN UNION 611 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927) (internal footnote omitted). 
 66 See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 220 (1890) (“The common law has always recognized a man’s house as his castle . . . .”); 
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In the first half of the twentieth century, the reverence for the home 
only intensified with the New Deal, which cast homes and homeownership 
as civic virtues.67  Government policy made housing the linchpin of 
Depression-era economic reform.  Profit-savvy financial and banking 
special interest groups were quick to respond.68  The marketing of the home 
as a powerful symbol, coupled with financial incentives, channeled wealth 
investment to residential real estate and solidified the cultural icon of the 
residential home.69 
The cultural status of the home provides a new perspective on the 
persistence of expansive protection and absolutist rhetoric in Fourth 
Amendment residential search.  The modern-day judicial sentiment that all 
details within the home are intimate details is eerily reminiscent of the 
Romantic ideal of the home as an idealized and encapsulated private 
domestic sphere in which to retreat from modern life.  Without claiming 
exclusive causation, the history of the domicile as a culturally supercharged 
property suggests one motivation for the maintenance of property concepts 
in residential search doctrine long after the Court disavowed this approach. 
Not only does the law reflect the cultural centrality of the home, it also 
entrenches and intensifies the home’s normative significance.  Laws 
protecting privacy influence what people view as private.  In light of the 
circularity between law and norms, the determination of the objective 
reasonableness of subjective expectations, which Katz requires, should not 
be solely majoritarian (i.e., what most people in society would deem 
private).70  Taking a strictly majoritarian view of privacy, without 
considering objective harm, creates a feedback loop that cements the iconic 
status of the home (and biases against minority interests and emerging 
technologies). 
C. Allocative Costs: Protecting the Home as a Justification for Less 
Privacy Protection Elsewhere 
Judicial doctrine and rhetoric constructing the home as a 
 
M.J. Savage, A Profane View of the Sanctum, 141 N. AM. REV. 137, 146–47 (1885) (“An 
Englishman’s house is his castle.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 67 See Ronald Tobey et al., Moving Out and Settling In: Residential Mobility, Home 
Owning, and the Public Enframing of Citizenship, 1921–1950, 95 AM. HIST. REV. 1395, 1413–19 
(1990). 
 68 See id. 
 69 See Alan Zundel, Policy Frames and Ethical Traditions: The Case of Homeownership for 
the Poor, 23 POL’Y STUD. J. 423, 426–28 (1995) (describing effect of the federal “Own Your 
Own Home” campaign and New Deal–era legislation on the ideology of homeownership). 
 70 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988) (“An expectation of 
privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection, however, unless society is prepared 
to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable.”); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 
(1984) (“The Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only 
those expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” (quoting Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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psychological and political fortress have created a strikingly inconsistent, 
and at times bizarre, pattern of privacy protection.71  The privileging of the 
physical home has stymied the efficient allocation of privacy by according 
too much protection to residential property and physical structures (and 
then undoing a share of that protection through exceptions based on 
property concepts or publicity, rather than privacy and crime control 
needs).  Privacy interests must be prioritized and balanced against other 
societal needs, such as safety, crime control, and judicial and governmental 
resources.72  The current patchwork of Fourth Amendment search 
protection does not strike an appropriate balance: in its permutations in 
various search contexts—residence, curtilage, garbage, and 
nonresidential—it overprotects and underprotects with respect to 
intrusiveness and harm.73  Perhaps courts and commentators implicitly 
recognize that in balancing societal interests in crime control versus 
privacy there is not unlimited privacy protection to go around.74  Rather 
than allocating privacy on the basis of intrusiveness, objective harm, and 
societal interests, however, courts have typically opted to allocate based on 
context or publicity.75 
This inefficiency extends beyond residential search: strong protection 
for the home often means less protection for other types of search.  This 
relationship contradicts common intuitions in criminal procedure.  Many 
scholars are keen proponents of strong privacy laws and worry about 
narrowing Fourth Amendment protection in the past half century.76  If more 
 
 71 For example, while curtilage receives probable cause protection, strip searches in schools 
are subject to the lower standard of reasonable suspicion.  See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642–43 (2009) (holding that school officials did not have reasonable 
suspicion to strip search thirteen-year-old girl based only on another student claiming to have 
received ibuprofen from her). 
 72 Kerr, supra note 8, passim (discussing privacy interests and the proper manner to regulate 
the use of new technologies for criminal investigations); see also ETZIONI, supra note 38, at 9 
(“[P]rivacy often is privileged over the common good . . . .”). 
 73 Chris Slobogin has argued that the “probable cause forever” approach to the Fourth 
Amendment is a significant cause of this problem.  See SLOBOGIN, supra note 11, at 28–30; see 
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (no Fourth Amendment protection for the 
phone numbers that residents dial); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437–40 (1976) (no 
warrant requirement to obtain bank records). 
 74 See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 31 (1997) (“It is clear . . . that 
neither privacy values nor costs are absolute.”); see also Kenneth Einar Himma, Privacy Versus 
Security: Why Privacy Is Not an Absolute Value or Right, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 866 (2007) 
(“[I]nformational privacy rights are below security rights in the moral hierarchy.”); cf. AVISHAI 
MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 201 (1996) (“The institutions in a decent society must not 
encroach upon personal privacy.”). 
 75 For example, the curtilage doctrine has motivated artificial and nonsensical approaches to 
publicity to undo the damage that housing exceptionalism creates.  The Fourth Amendment does 
not protect curtilage from aerial surveillance based on the questionable reasoning that commercial 
flights routinely enter the airspace above the curtilage.  See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
213–15 (1986).  Similarly, driveways lose protection because they are susceptible to public 
trespass.  See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1194–95 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 76 See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 60, at 514–16. 
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privacy is a good thing,77 the argument goes, then constitutional solicitude 
for the home is also a good thing because it affords protection in an age of 
shrinking privacy.   
A review of the Fourth Amendment case law reveals that the home 
does not serve as a bastion of privacy protection that secures privacy in 
other contexts.  Rather, courts frequently employ the constitutional status 
of the home to justify more limited protection in contexts outside of the 
home.  For example, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Supreme 
Court held that aerial surveillance of a commercial plant was not subject to 
Fourth Amendment protection because the plant complex was not 
analogous to the “‘curtilage’ of a dwelling” and because, unlike 
homeowners, businesses do not have an interest in being free from 
inspection.78  The Court suggested that it would have extended protection if 
the complex had been a residence, “where privacy expectations are most 
heightened.”79  In California v. Carney, the Court wrote that, in addition to 
the consideration of mobility, “‘less rigorous warrant requirements govern 
because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is 
significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.’ . . .  These 
reduced expectations of privacy derive . . . from the pervasive regulation of 
vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.”80  In a similar vein, 
recent scholarship charges that technological searches and restraints, such 
as biometric scanners and DNA collection, do not receive protection 
because they “do not take the form of physical intrusions on sacred 
spaces.”81  I do not claim that residential search precedents are the sole 
reason these contexts receive less protection; rather the case law illustrates 
how home-search cases provide additional justification for limiting 
protection outside of the home. 
This dynamic is particularly worrisome in light of the evidence that 
privileging residential privacy may result in less net privacy protection 
because most search activity is nonresidential.  William Stuntz observes 
that “there are many, many more street encounters than searches of private 
homes” and that “protecting privacy in the home casts a smaller substantive 
shadow than protecting privacy in glove compartments or jacket pockets.”82  
The symbolic stronghold of the home, which looms so large in American 
consciousness, diverts both public and judicial concern from other privacy 
interests.  Social scientists have described how basing legal or social 
 
 77 See United States v. Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting the 
importance of privacy to a free and open society). 
 78 476 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1986).  In general, commercial property is also subject to a lower 
standard of reasonableness when it is also subject to regulation and privacy-dissolving civil 
inspection.  See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987). 
 79 Dow, 476 U.S. at 237 n.4. 
 80 471 U.S. 386, 390–92 (1985) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–68 
(1976)). 
 81 Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1359 (2008). 
 82 See Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1061–62. 
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consequences on whether an action has occurred inside or outside of a 
protected territory makes the “territory appear[] as the agent doing the 
controlling.”83  Of course, removing protection from residential spaces does 
not guarantee that protections will accrue to important, nonresidential 
interests.  However, reconceiving residential privacy rights and the Fourth 
Amendment as safeguarding vital interests and addressing substantive 
privacy harms can prompt such reform. 
To the extent that public and private spaces compete for protection, 
there are also distributional consequences to the dominance of the home in 
Fourth Amendment search.  Low-income individuals spend a greater share 
of their time in public venues and socialize more frequently in public 
spaces, which typically receive less protection under the Fourth 
Amendment.  In addition, tying search protection to the physical home has 
made residents of nonaffixed mobile motor homes subject to warrantless 
search and seizure and created uncertainty as to whether the homeless 
receive protection in their public and transient living spaces.84 
II 
PSYCHOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HOUSING EXCEPTIONALISM: 
REEXAMINING PRIVACY, PERSONHOOD, AND EXPECTATIONS 
Courts and commentators justify the expansive protection of the 
home, often to the neglect of substantive privacy, on the view that the 
physical home and “home territory” are psychologically unique and vital to 
its occupants.  These accounts focus on the importance—or even the 
necessity—of strong search protection for residential property.85  Much 
case law and commentary presumes a potent territorial interest in the 
protection of the physical home and that the Fourth Amendment safeguards 
the “personhood” property of the domicile.86  The accepted wisdom is that 
stringent and expansive residential search protection, focused on the 
housing structure and property concepts, accords with citizens’ subjective 
expectations of privacy.  This Part considers each of these rationales in turn 
and contends that the evidence belies the psychological exigency that 
courts and commentators attribute to the Fourth Amendment home. 
A. The Myth of Privacy as a Territorial Imperative 
Fourth Amendment doctrine implicates a distinctly spatial and 
 
 83 ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY: IT’S THEORY AND HISTORY 33 (1986). 
 84 See Carney, 471 U.S. at 392–94; David H. Steinberg, Constructing Homes for the 
Homeless? Searching for a Fourth Amendment Standard, 41 DUKE L.J. 1508, 1536–40 (1992) 
(describing the Connecticut state court case of State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1991), 
which considered the search of a homeless man living under a bridge underpass but ultimately 
extended protection on other grounds); cf. United States v. Fultz, 146 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 
1988) (holding that homeless man had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a closed container 
that he stored with permission in another person’s garage). 
 85 See supra notes 26–56 and accompanying text. 
 86 See Radin, supra note 2, at 1013; see also Kelly, supra note 2, at 28. 
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territorial conception of residential privacy—a conception that is at odds 
with the psychological research and privacy literature.  A key 
jurisprudential justification for privileging the physical home is the 
formulation of privacy as exclusionary control over vital physical spaces—
the “sanctity of the home.”87  The Supreme Court has held that nowhere is 
the “zone of privacy” more clearly defined “than when bounded by the 
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home.”88  The 
research literature belies this account and indicates that privacy is primarily 
psychological and relational, not territorial. 
If privacy depended upon control of space, and specifically of homes, 
stable and robust privacy norms would persist with respect to residential 
spaces.  Instead, the research reveals that individuals adapt their privacy 
norms to their environments.89  Expectations of residential privacy vary 
widely among cultures.90  Poorer individuals tend to expect and demand 
less privacy.91  Psychological and developmental studies indicate that 
people are socialized to identify certain areas as private and that these areas 
may change based on subsequent experiences.92  In addition, privacy 
regulation “can serve the important social function[] of allowing checks on 
compliance with norms.”93 
Contrary to the claims of some commentators, there is no evidence 
that residential privacy reflects an innate, biological drive to defend against 
territorial intrusion.94  Humans are evolutionarily social beings, and the 
 
 87 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588 (1980) (illustrating the jurisprudential 
construction of the home as a protected “territory” at the core of the Fourth Amendment). 
 88 See id. at 589. 
 89 See Peter Kelvin, A Social-Psychological Examination of Privacy, 12 BRIT. J. SOC. & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 248, 256 (1973) (“[A]reas of privacy, being a function of norms, may 
change—they are not immutable.”).  Similarly, Amitai Etzioni observes, “Although some vague 
notion of privacy exists in most, if not all, societies, the specific way we treat privacy in our law 
and culture is a recent phenomenon . . . .  [P]rivacy is hardly a near-sacred concept that cannot be 
reformulated.”  ETZIONI, supra note 38, at 188 (internal footnote omitted). 
 90 For example, tribal communities in Brazil live in communal housing, and the Javanese, 
whose dwellings frequently lack doors, freely enter and wander within others’ private homes.  
Irwin Altman, Privacy Regulation: Culturally Universal or Culturally Specific?, 33 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 66, 72–74 (1977); see also SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: DIALECTICS 
OF DISCLOSURE 24 (2002) (“[C]ultures may vary in the degree to which privacy plays a role in 
social life.”). 
 91 See Alexander Kira, Privacy and the Bathroom, in ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: 
MAN AND HIS PHYSICAL SETTING 269, 274–75 (Harold M. Proshansky et al. eds., 1970) (finding 
that lower socioeconomic status results in more crowded living conditions that relax privacy 
norms); Robert S. Laufer & Maxine Wolfe, Privacy as a Concept and a Social Issue: A 
Multidimensional Developmental Theory, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 22, 29 (1977) (reporting that children 
and adolescents cited the bathroom as a private place only in families with few members or a low 
occupant-per-room ratio); Barry Schwartz, The Social Psychology of Privacy, 73 AM. J. SOC. 
741, 743 (1968) (“Privacy has always been a luxury.”). 
 92 See Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 91, at 29. 
 93 See Stephen T. Margulis, On the Status and Contribution of Westin’s and Altman’s 
Theories of Privacy, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 411, 416 (2003). 
 94 But see, e.g., Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 809, 815–18 (2007) (“[A] lack of private space . . . will threaten survival.”). 
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flexibility of their property arrangements (and defense of territorial 
property) reflects this pro-social orientation.95  From prehistoric man to 
Native-American tribes to modern communes, people have cohabitated in 
groups, foregone private-property systems and stable settlement bounds, 
and lived nomadically.96  In order for social groups to function, individuals 
must submit at times to various social and physical incursions that are 
acceptable to the group, or a dominant force within the group, but 
undesirable to the affected individual.97  Inclinations toward absolute 
defense of individual or family territory would reduce the cooperative 
enterprises necessary for survival.98  Territoriality, in the sense of robust 
defense of private property, is a “strategy that can be turned on and off”99 
when circumstances alter its efficiency.100  Fourth Amendment protection 
of the home responds to normative values that are subject to debate, 
prioritization, and fluctuation, not to biological imperative.101 
The current Fourth Amendment approach has conflated privacy, a 
concept that is essentially relational, with the protection of physical 
space.102  Contrary to the notion of residential privacy as spatial exclusion, 
psychologists study privacy in the domain of interaction.103  Privacy 
enables control over self-disclosure and allows others to access the 
individual’s self.104  In their interactions and relationships, people 
 
 95 In many instances, people employ territorial strategies to increase, not prevent, social 
contacts.  See Peter H. Klopfer & Daniel I. Rubenstein, The Concept Privacy and Its Biological 
Basis, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 52, 54 (1977). 
 96 See, e.g., SACK, supra note 83, at 7–9 (describing Chippewa Indian settlements). 
 97 Territoriality serves a constellation of functions, none of which maps onto residential 
criminal search.  Owners or residents involved in criminal investigations are not resisting 
territorial invasion in order to affect their neighbors’ behaviors or norms, increase the likelihood 
of passing on their genes, or personalize or mark territory to signal vigilance or community 
investment.  Cf. Ralph B. Taylor & Sidney Brower, Home and Near-Home Territories, in HOME 
ENVIRONMENTS 183, 193 (Irwin Altman & Carol M. Werner eds., 1985). 
 98 See SACK, supra note 83, at 24. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Territoriality studies focus on defense of feeding areas in situations where such defense is 
efficient.  See Rada Dyson-Hudson & Eric Alden Smith, Human Territoriality: An Ecological 
Reassessment, 80 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 21, 22 (1978); Marshall D. Sahlins, The Social Life of 
Monkeys, Apes and Primitive Man, in THE EVOLUTION OF MAN’S CAPACITY FOR CULTURE 54, 
57 (J.N. Spuhler ed., 1959) (comparing territoriality in subhuman primates with primitive social 
behavior). 
 101 A variety of forces other than evolution shape human behavior: social drives, cultural 
learning and reproduction, and environmental changes.  An evolutionary or biological explanation 
for territoriality would be tautological.  See SACK, supra note 83, at 21. 
 102 See e.g., supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 103 See IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 18 (1975) (defining 
privacy regulation as a means to achieve an individual’s or a group’s optimum level of social 
interaction and access to the self); Patricia Brierley Newell, Perspectives on Privacy, 15 J. 
ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 87, 91–93, 94–97 (1995). 
 104 See ALTMAN, supra note 103, at 18; Kenneth Einar Himma, Separation, Risk, and the 
Necessity of Privacy to Well-Being: A Comment on Adam Moore’s Toward Informational Privacy 
Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 847, 850 (2007) (“The need for personal space is not the same as 
the need for privacy.  My need to have a home of my own . . . is primarily motivated by a desire 
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perennially engage in strategic self-presentation in order to shape others’ 
views of their personality and disposition.105  Physical space is important 
only insofar as it secures the ability to expose or conceal different aspects 
of our self to others.106  Even Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous description 
of privacy as “the right to be let alone” has a relational interpretation: we 
often wish others to leave us alone to eventually rejoin them, and we want 
government to leave us alone to safeguard the individuality and spontaneity 
essential to social existence.107 
B. Theory Versus Evidence: The Personhood Interest in Residential 
Privacy 
A principal claim in the scholarly literature is that residential privacy 
and the right of exclusionary control of the physical home are vital to 
identity and psychological well-being—indeed, to an individual’s very 
personhood.  In her influential theory of property for personhood, Margaret 
Radin argued that certain kinds of property, with homes as the 
paradigmatic example, constitute an individual’s self, enable proper self-
development, and encourage human flourishing.108  By virtue of the 
personhood connection, the law should accord owners broad liberty to 
control such property.109 
Based on the personhood interest in the home, Radin championed 
strict protection of privacy rights in residential search and seizure.  She 
argued that personhood property provides a normative guide for Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and underscores the need for heightened 
protection in the home and possibly in vehicles as well.110  Other scholars 
echoed Radin’s call for stringent protection of privacy rights in residential 
 
for security, not privacy.”); Patricia Brierley Newell, A Systems Model of Privacy, 14 J. ENVTL. 
PSYCHOL. 65, 75–76 (1994) (reporting that when asked about their actions to acquire privacy, 
less than half of subjects mentioned places and that a quarter of subjects included social 
interaction or other prosocial behavior as part of their privacy experiences). 
 105 See Roy F. Baumeister, A Self-Presentational View of Social Phenomena, 91 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 3, 3 (1982) (explaining that self-presentation is “aimed at establishing . . . an image of the 
individual in the minds of others”); Edward E. Jones & Thane S. Pittman, Toward a General 
Theory of Strategic Self-Presentation, in 1 PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SELF 231, 
233 (Jerry Suls ed., 1982) (defining strategic self-presentation as “those features of behavior . . . 
designed to elicit or shape others’ attributions of the actor’s dispositions” (emphasis omitted)). 
 106 See ALTMAN, supra note 103, at 18 (stating that privacy is important only to the extent 
that it allows individuals to restrict access to themselves); Glenorchy McBride, Privacy: A 
Relationship Model, 7 MAN-ENV’T SYS. 145, 148 (1977) (arguing that possession or ownership 
of “any space, personal, real estate, or temporary, may appear at first sight to be an individual 
construct [of privacy], yet since it always concerns access, ownership is in fact a statement of 
social relationships between people”). 
 107 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see 
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 66, at 193; cf. Bascuas, supra note 23, at 585 (observing that 
Justice Brandeis’s formulation “is more a rhetorical than a categorical characterization”). 
 108 See Radin, supra note 2, at 967–68. 
 109 See id. at 960, 978. 
 110 See id. at 996–1002. 
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property on the basis of the prodigious “psychic toll” to personhood.111 
The empirical evidence does not support personhood theory’s claim 
that exclusionary control over the physical home is a requisite constituent 
of personal identity and psychosocial functioning.112  American homes are 
not personhood property, inextricably intertwined with self and identity, 
but commodities that on average are bought, sold, or rented every five 
years.113  Research shows that homes play a role, but not a starring one, in 
self-concept.  Contrary to the notion that control over the physical home is 
of the utmost importance to self and personhood, subjects rate 
relationships, personal characteristics, and body parts as more closely 
connected to self than physical possessions.114  Moreover, evidence 
suggests that exercising control over an object, such as one’s dwelling, 
does not substantially increase the object’s connection to the self.115  Within 
the home, residents use household possessions in a utilitarian fashion and 
do not strongly link those items to personal identity;116 the exceptions—
 
 111 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 2, at 6 (arguing that the harms to personhood resulting from 
residential search may merit compensation to the occupants of the home). 
 112 Although Radin’s account focuses heavily on property, she does recognize the social and 
relational aspects of home.  See Radin, supra note 2, at 1013 (“Our reverence for the sanctity of 
the home is rooted in the understanding that the home is inextricably part of the individual, the 
family, and the fabric of society.”).  In general, Radin’s theory is somewhat amorphous and does 
not specify whether the crux of the personhood interest is to be a person, to be a particular person, 
to retain the same identity, or even to have a personality.  Compare id. at 957 (“[T]o achieve 
proper self-development—to be a person—an individual needs some control over resources in the 
external environment.”), with id. at 968 (“If an object you now control is bound up in your future 
plans or in your anticipation of your future self, and it is partly these plans for your own 
continuity that make you a person, then your personhood depends on the realization of these 
expectations.”). 
 113 See KRISTIN A. HANSEN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SEASONALITY OF MOVES AND 
DURATION OF RESIDENCE 4 (1998), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/p70-
66.pdf; see also Susan Saegert, The Role of Housing in the Experience of Dwelling, in HOME 
ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 97, at 287, 290 (stating that the connection people feel toward their 
homes “depends on the housing market, the rental market, and the job market”).  Unlike in the 
United States, homes in some cultures are imbued with personhood.  For example, the Zuni view 
the home as a living thing and the principle setting for communication with the spirit world, and 
the Tswana of South Africa believe that the spirits of their ancestors reside in the home’s 
courtyard.  See Carol M. Werner et al., Temporal Aspects of Homes: A Transactional Perspective, 
in HOME ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 97, at 1, 8, 20. 
 114 See Ernst Prelinger, Extension and Structure of the Self, 47 J. PSYCHOL. 13, 14–23 (1959) 
(presenting the results of a study asking adult subjects to rate eight categories of items on a scale 
of whether those items were “definitely a part of your own self”).  One study that asked 
participants to rate items on a self/not-self scale found that relatives and friends, as well as body 
organs and even favorite vacation place, received higher ratings than dwelling.  See Russell W. 
Belk, Identity and the Relevance of Market, Personal, and Community Objects, in MARKETING 
AND SEMIOTICS 151, 154–56 (Jean Umiker-Sebeok ed., 1987).  Subjects rated the following 
items very similarly to current dwelling: favorite casual clothes, favorite vehicle now owned, and 
favorite book.  Id. at 155.  Also relevant to Fourth Amendment law, at least one study has found 
that subjects rank cars similarly to homes in terms of consumer’s attachment and integration of 
the object into self-concept.  See A. Dwayne Ball & Lori H. Tasaki, The Role and Measurement 
of Attachment in Consumer Behavior, 1 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 155, 166 (1992). 
 115 See Prelinger, supra note 114, at 19. 
 116 In general, the psychology and sociology literature does not indicate, as Radin proposes, 
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rarely the target of criminal investigation—are family heirlooms, diaries, 
and photographs.117 
The experimental research suggests that discrete privacy invasions of 
physical spaces that leave social relationships intact do not damage self or 
psychosocial functioning.118  Individuals are surprisingly adaptable to even 
acute losses in residential spaces.119  For example, psychologists have 
found that victims of natural disasters—whose houses are not merely 
searched but destroyed—typically do not suffer long-term mental health 
impairment.120  High-quality relationships, not the physical home or 
residential privacy, are what is essential to self and psychosocial 
functioning.121 
A related theory in the privacy literature is that the incursion on 
privacy in general, not the personhood-securing nature of residential 
privacy rights in particular, causes the harm.122  Privacy scholars have long 
recognized a personhood interest in privacy irrespective of property or 
place.123  On this view, privacy enables personhood by safeguarding “those 
 
that the home is a requisite constituent of personhood.  Cf. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE 
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 22–25 (1959) (describing the role of the “setting” for 
individuals’ functioning). 
 117 See Deborah A. Prentice, Psychological Correspondence of Possessions, Attitudes, and 
Values, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 993, 995–96 (1987); see also MIHALY 
CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS: DOMESTIC 
SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 55–58 (1981) (identifying ten categories “symptomatic of what kinds of 
things people cherish in their homes”). 
 118 See Lois M. Haggard & Carol M. Werner, Situational Support, Privacy Regulation, and 
Stress, 11 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 313, 334 (1990) (discussing how an experimental 
privacy invasion, in the form of a confederate entering and lingering in a subject’s room, did not 
cause objective harm to the subject’s mood or assessment of the environment and actually 
improved the subject’s performance of a secondary task).  Instead, the research literature suggests 
that only a profound and longstanding loss of privacy in an individual’s residence will threaten 
her personhood.  See David A. D’Atri, Psychophysiological Responses to Crowding, 7 ENV’T & 
BEHAV. 237, 247–50 (1975) (discussing a study that found a correlation between the number of 
inmates sharing a given space and the inmates’ blood pressure levels). 
 119 For example, long-term disability, which has massive and irreversible impacts on privacy 
in the home, typically does not decrease happiness.  See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON 
HAPPINESS 152–53 (2006) (noting that disabled persons can adapt quickly to their conditions). 
 120 See Peter Steinglass & Ellen Gerrity, Forced Displacement to a New Environment, in 
STRESSORS AND THE ADJUSTMENT DISORDERS 399, 401 (Joseph D. Noshpitz & R. Dean 
Coddington eds., 1990).  A few studies have even found that forced relocation due to natural 
disaster predicts increased satisfaction with family life and neighborhood relations.  See, e.g., 
Thomas E. Drabek et al., The Impact of Disaster on Kin Relationships, 37 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
481, 490–92 (1975) (family life); Harry Estill Moore, Some Emotional Concomitants of Disaster, 
42 MENTAL HYGIENE 45, 49–50 (1958) (neighborhood relations). 
 121 See Roy F. Baumeister, The Self, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 680, 
680 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (“Selfhood is almost unthinkable outside a social 
context . . . .  Selves are . . . tools for relating to other people.”); see also JOHN T. CACIOPPO & 
WILLIAM PATRICK, LONELINESS: HUMAN NATURE AND THE NEED FOR SOCIAL CONNECTION 
240 (2008) (noting that quality, not quantity, of relationships predicts loneliness).  
 122 Alternatively, the fact that the government is the home invader may create the harm that 
results from residential search.  If this is the case though, then it calls into question public 
acceptance of housing inspection and zoning. 
 123 See Kelvin, supra note 89, at 259 (“It is only in a condition of perceived privacy that one 
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attributes of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood”124 and 
protecting, as Warren and Brandeis describe, an individual’s self-definition 
of his or her “inviolate personality.”125  This conception of personhood 
might support, for example, the role of privacy in Fourteenth Amendment 
cases addressing sexuality, sodomy, and contraception, but it does not 
explain housing exceptionalism or the assumption that government search 
of the home invariably threatens personhood.126  If personhood accrues 
more squarely to privacy than property or homes, this relationship calls into 
question the privileging of the home in Fourth Amendment doctrine 
relative to comparable nonresidential privacy interests. 
In addition, personhood theory suffers from indeterminacy and a 
tendency toward absolutism.  It does not provide a viable litmus test for 
differentiating between protected and unprotected interests.  As Jed 
Rubenfeld writes, “Where is our self-definition not at stake?”127  
Compounding this problem, the moral character of personhood and the 
rights language of privacy push toward absolutism: once identified, rights 
warrant strict protection.128 
Perhaps one of the more compelling arguments for personhood and 
residential privacy—which personhood theory does not, but should, make 
explicit—is that control over privacy signals status.129  Government action 
symbolizes social judgments as to an individual’s status and worth.130  
Individuals who are subject to privacy invasions on an ongoing basis may 
 
perceives oneself removed and protected from the power of others: and it is only to the extent that 
one has this sense of privacy that one can feel truly oneself, and responsible for one’s 
actions . . . .”). 
 124 Paul A. Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School, Address to the American Law Institute 
(May 23, 1975), in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 52ND ANNUAL MEETING 568, 574 (1976); 
see also JEFFREY REIMAN, CRITICAL MORAL LIBERALISM: THEORY & PRACTICE 165 (1997) 
(“The right to privacy is the right to the existence of a social practice that makes it possible for me 
to think of this existence as mine. . . .  The right to privacy, then, protects the individual’s interest 
in becoming, being, and remaining a moral person.” (emphasis added)); Jeffrey H. Reiman, 
Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39 (1976) (stating that privacy 
confers a “moral title to [one’s] existence” (emphasis omitted)). 
 125 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 66, at 205. 
 126 See W.H. Foddy & W.R. Finighan, The Concept of Privacy from a Symbolic Interaction 
Perspective, 10 J. FOR THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 1, 6 (1980) (“Privacy is the possession by an 
individual of control over information that would interfere with the acceptance of his claims for 
an identity within a specified role relationship.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 127 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 754–55 (1989). 
 128 See William R. Lund, Politics, Virtue, and the Right to Do Wrong: Assessing the 
Communitarian Critique of Rights, 28 J. SOC. PHIL. 101, 104, 107 (1997) (quoting Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s statement that “rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical 
extreme”); see also ETZIONI, supra note 38, at 190 (“As the right to privacy is viewed as an 
inalienable right, it does not yield to the common good.”). 
 129 See Newell, supra note 103, at 93 (reviewing empirical studies of human behavior and 
finding that dominant or powerful individuals establish themselves in more private spaces and 
strongly enforce privacy boundaries). 
 130 In a self-report experiment that asked subjects to describe a situation where they 
preferred privacy, 76 percent of subjects mentioned whether others had respected their privacy.  
See Newell, supra note 104, at 74. 
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infer that others do not find them worthy of respect131 and ultimately come 
to believe they are, in fact, not worthy of respect.  This impugns the 
common practices of repeat Terry stops and vehicular searches that 
disproportionately affect poor and minority individuals.132  Constricting the 
scope of residential search protection or lowering the standard for home 
searches may also disproportionately impact poor and minority individuals 
if the history of discriminatory targeting holds true.  This underscores the 
need to address discriminatory police conduct; in the face of narrowed 
constitutional protection, the creation of statutory remedies and tortlike 
compensation can address discriminatory search or targeting.133 
C. An Evidence-Based Analysis of Subjective Expectations of Privacy 
Turning to the realm of public opinion, the Supreme Court has used 
subjective expectations of privacy to justify the blunt and expansive 
approach of housing exceptionalism.134  The doctrinal assumption appears 
to be that citizens hold uniformly high perceptions of intrusiveness for a 
wide array of residential search contexts.135  The empirical evidence reveals 
a more variable and nuanced picture of residential privacy expectations and 
indicates that some contexts of home search, such as certain outdoor 
residential searches, do not raise strong privacy concerns.136  Meanwhile, 
contexts of search that do not necessarily involve the home, such as 
wiretapping, searching luggage on a bus, or tapping into a corporation’s 
computer, receive higher intrusiveness ratings than most categories of 
residential search.137  This research raises a serious question of whether 
courts have assumed a more uniform and robust privacy expectation in 
various aspects of the home than citizens themselves. 
In their seminal study of privacy expectations, Christopher Slobogin 
and Joseph Schumacher asked individuals to rate the degree of “invasion of 
privacy or autonomy” in various search scenarios.138  They found that 
 
 131 See Taslitz, supra note 22, at 15; see also Altman, supra note 90, at 68 (“A person who 
can successfully control interaction with others is likely to develop more of a sense of 
competence and self-worth than a person who fails repeatedly to regulate contacts with others.”). 
 132 See Taslitz, supra note 22, at 15, 21–22 (noting the concern of minority group members 
that police officers stop young black males without reason). 
 133 For example, Christopher Slobogin has suggested that an independent ombudsman could 
administer a damages remedy and assess monetary damages against individual police officers, for 
discriminatory action, and departments, for failure to train officers on race issues.  See SLOBOGIN, 
supra note 11, at 37. 
 134 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 135 See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text. 
 136 See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 16, at 739–41 (noting that safety inspections of 
residences and inspections of burned-down houses do not implicate substantial privacy concerns 
but still receive Fourth Amendment protection). 
 137 See id. at 738–39 (body cavity searches and wiretaps received higher intrusiveness scores 
than bedroom searches and other residential searches); Blumenthal et al., supra note 16, at 358 
tbl.1 (tapping into corporation’s computer and perusing bank records received higher 
intrusiveness ratings than any type of residential search). 
 138 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 16, at 736. 
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subjects gave markedly different privacy scores, for example, to searching 
curbside garbage, watching a person in the yard with binoculars, and 
searching a bedroom.139  Subsequent independent research has replicated 
these findings.140  Slobogin and Schumacher observed that some privacy 
expectations, such as the perceived unintrusiveness of curbside garbage 
searches and aerial curtilage searches, are consistent with Fourth 
Amendment doctrine while other privacy expectations diverge from Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.141  The variability in intrusiveness ratings for 
residential search scenarios casts doubt on the doctrinal tendency to treat 
the home, absent publicity or a specified exception, as a “force field” of 
uniformly elevated privacy expectations. 
Although Slobogin and Schumacher did not manipulate this variable 
explicitly, their results also suggest that expectations of residential privacy 
concentrate in the interior living spaces of the home and diminish in 
exterior spaces.142  Subjects rated searches of bedrooms, interiors of mobile 
homes, and college dorm rooms as highly intrusive but rated searches of 
garages, aerial surveillance of yards, and searches of curbside garbage as 
moderately or minimally intrusive.143  Their findings also suggest a strong 
privacy interest in interpersonal exchange.  For example, subjects gave 
wiretaps the highest intrusiveness rating.  Similarly, we can speculate that 
subjects may have rated searches of the bedroom as highly intrusive 
because of its strong association with interpersonal relationships and sexual 
intimacy.144 
Of course, subjective expectations alone cannot justify Fourth 
Amendment protection.  Citizens’ expectations of privacy may impose 
prohibitively high social costs, threaten undue impacts on insulated groups 
or minorities, or diverge too sharply from objective harm.145  Scholars have 
 
 139 The study did not assess several residential contexts that frequently receive Fourth 
Amendment protection, such as searches of garbage within curtilage or searches of specific 
interior rooms other than a bedroom.  See id. at 729, 738–39 tbl.1. 
 140 See Blumenthal et al., supra note 16, at 345 (“Our subjects’ intrusiveness ratings are 
quite consistent with [Slobogin and Schumacher’s] results; each of our samples correlated highly 
with their overall data.”). 
 141 See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 16, at 739–40. 
 142 See id. at 738–39.  They did find that subjects rated open-field searches as moderately 
intrusive.  See id.  However, from the perspective of relational privacy, this item may have 
conflated property-focused expectations of autonomy with privacy-focused expectations of 
autonomy because the authors framed the question as being about privacy and autonomy and 
described the open field as being surrounded by a fence and “No Trespassing” signs.  See id. at 
736. 
 143 See id. at 738–39. 
 144 Obtaining information through the use of undercover agents also received moderately 
high intrusiveness ratings.  See id.; see also Kelvin, supra note 89, at 255 (sexual intercourse 
typically subject to strong norms of privacy). 
 145 Subjective expectations of privacy may not track objective harm: laboratory studies of 
minor privacy invasions show that subjects complain about intrusion and privacy violations but 
report no negative effects on mood or task performance.  See Haggard & Werner, supra note 118, 
at 334. 
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long complained that reasonable expectations of privacy are amorphous 
and uncertain146 and suffer from an inescapable circularity between existing 
law and expectations.147  At the same time, Fourth Amendment doctrine 
should not neglect privacy expectations entirely, especially in light of the 
propensity for searches perceived as highly intrusive to inflict 
psychological or other harm.148 
III 
POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL RATIONALES FOR PRIVILEGING THE HOME 
Political concerns and constitutional originalism are fundamental to 
modern jurisprudence on residential search and seizure.  A principal 
purpose of Fourth Amendment protection is to guard against police 
overreaching; the physical home is particularly vulnerable on this account 
because of the many possessions it contains as well as the political value of 
a zone of governmental noninterference.  The Supreme Court has also 
privileged the physical home on the theory that the Framers intended its 
utmost protection.  Original intent has guided the Court’s, and particularly 
Justice Scalia’s, interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.149 
A. Political Rationales: The Dangers of Government Overreaching 
The political rationales for housing exceptionalism revolve around the 
common axis of limiting government’s reach.  First, courts fear that absent 
the constraints of a warrant and probable cause the police will be able to 
ransack a house and its curtilage for evidence unrelated to the crime under 
investigation and use that information to harass, coerce, or prosecute the 
suspect.150  According to this account, the multitude of personal property, 
records, and effects within houses creates an exceptional risk of police 
 
 146 See, e.g., Bascuas, supra note 23, at 580 (describing reasonable expectations of privacy 
as “subjective specters that . . . judges view idiosyncratically”); Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the 
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 
1128 (1987) (“The potentially limitless number of factors relevant to the determination whether a 
given expectation of privacy is ‘reasonable’ has resulted in confusion and uneven application of 
constitutional doctrine.”). 
 147 See Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 
SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188; cf. Bailey H. Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally Protecting Reasonable 
Expectations, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 19, 32–33 (1997) (arguing that this circularity enables a 
feedback mechanism because it cannot be avoided completely). 
 148 See Kelvin, supra note 89, at 252 (Privacy refers to a “subjective state . . . .  [P]rivacy is 
perceived privacy.”). 
 149 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 150 See United States v. Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that the 
ultimate question for the Fourth Amendment is “‘whether, if the particular form of [conduct] 
practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of 
privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with 
the aims of a free and open society’” (quoting 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 3.2, at 165 (1984))); cf. Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under 
the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 53 (1995) (proposing additional privacy protections 
for property or information seized by government). 
128 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol.95:xxx 
overreaching and harassment. 
Government overreaching is indisputably a proper concern of the 
Fourth Amendment, but there is reason to doubt that Fourth Amendment 
doctrine and housing exceptionalism effectively address this risk.  
Concerns of overreaching and harassment may justify a subset of 
residential protections but not the expansive and categorical reach of the 
home.  Thermal scans of the home, for example, receive substantial 
protection despite the fact that the limited range of information discernible 
by the technology sharply constrains police overreaching in a given search.  
Also, contrary to the assumption that homes are uniquely vulnerable, the 
potential for overreaching and harassment appears higher in nonresidential 
contexts that currently receive more limited protection, such as searches of 
financial records and computer storage.151 
Even if the home is uniquely susceptible to overreaching, the plain-
view seizure doctrine calls into question the ability of the Fourth 
Amendment to prevent this harm.  The case law has clearly established that 
the police have a right to seize evidence that is in plain view so long as they 
are lawfully searching the area that contains the evidence and they have 
probable cause to believe that it is evidence of criminal activity.152  Because 
so much is in plain view of the police during many searches, this doctrine 
undoes much of the protection against overreaching that the Fourth 
Amendment seeks to confer.153  It is not evident why probable cause and 
warrant protection, rather than warrant substitutes and a rule restricting 
seizure to the subject of the search (i.e., a rule that is the opposite of the 
plain-view seizure doctrine), are the solutions to the problem of 
overreaching.154 
The second major rationale for privileging residential privacy is that 
the home affords a haven from the reach of government.  In this view, the 
home should establish a bright line that government may not cross.  This 
line creates a zone of privacy and autonomy that is essential to human 
 
 151 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 319 (2008) (describing data-mining efforts by the federal government); 
Robert Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States and Its 
De-evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 84 (2008) (arguing for 
strengthening employee privacy rights particularly as technology and workplace flexibility erode 
the strict division between work and home). 
 152 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134–36 (1990) (establishing standard for the 
plain-view seizure doctrine); cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987) (holding that 
when police move objects in homes to obtain a better view, they initiate a separate search subject 
to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement). 
 153 It is not clear whether the plain-view seizure doctrine operates as a release valve when 
the stringency of Fourth Amendment doctrine threatens crime-control needs, or whether the 
Fourth Amendment reduces the impact of the plain view doctrine by constraining the scope and 
reducing the number of searches that may give rise to corollary seizures.  Most likely, both are 
true. 
 154 Doctrines prohibiting police actions that bear the indices of harassment, such as 
prosecuting for minor violations, repeatedly searching a particular person or group, or using 
crimes unrelated to the original investigation to obtain pleas, could also address these concerns. 
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flourishing and productive citizenship.  If it is true that a quantum of 
autonomy and privacy protection is necessary, and I am willing to accept 
that premise, then it seems that the Supreme Court has given away the 
farm.  As Professor Stuntz has observed, residential searches represent a 
small fraction of total search activity.155  If the goal is to provide citizens 
with a robust zone of noninterference, then it is difficult to offer a 
principled explanation for the choice of the home over more common 
search contexts, including the modern-day, computerized equivalents of 
“papers[] and effects” cited in the Fourth Amendment.156 
B. Originalism Revisited 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly trumpeted fidelity to the Framers’ 
intent in Fourth Amendment cases, asserting that stringent protection of the 
physical home follows from the plain language of the Fourth 
Amendment.157  Justice Scalia has stated that in cases of residential search, 
courts should strive for the “preservation of that degree of privacy against 
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”158  
The historical record and scholarship offer a more nuanced view of the 
claims of original intent. 
Residential property was an important privacy concern in the 
Founding Era, but it was not the only important concern.159  Mail and 
writings were a particularly strong focus of early colonial privacy rights.  
Court cases, internal post office regulation, and the Organic Postal Act of 
1825 accorded near-absolute protection to mail.160  Judicial opinions of that 
 
 155 See Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1061 (“[P]rotecting privacy in the home casts a smaller 
substantive shadow than protecting privacy in glove compartments or jacket pockets.”). 
 156 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 157 Cf. Maclin, supra note 18, at 896–97 (“[T]he Justices consult the history of the 
Amendment on a selective basis . . . .  [T]he Article proposes that the Court stop considering the 
historical origins of the Fourth Amendment unless it is able to develop a more effective and 
consistent method by which to do so.”). 
 158 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 589 (1980) (Fourth Amendment protection of privacy rights in the home “finds its roots in 
clear and specific constitutional terms: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . 
shall not be violated.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)). 
 159 See Fabio Arcila, In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law 
History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 10–12 (2007) (describing 
controversy over writs of assistance); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 590 (1999) (“[T]he Framers adopted constitutional search 
and seizure provisions with the precise aim of ensuring the protection of person and house by 
prohibiting legislative approval of general warrants.” (emphasis added)).  But see David E. 
Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding Revisited, 33 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 48–49 (2005) (arguing that in the Framing Era, the Fourth 
Amendment applied only to unlawful house searches). 
 160 Because postmasters started the first newspapers, citizens suspected that private mail 
would become public news.  In addition, concerns circulated during the revolutionary period that 
governments were opening or tampering with mail and that private individuals would steal mail 
in order to glean information about each others’ assets and commit theft or fraud.  See DAVID J. 
SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 9–16 (1978); Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping 
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era observed that “papers are often the dearest property a man can have,”161 
and commentators charged that the paramount harm in residential search 
was having a man’s “desks broken open, his private books, letters, and 
papers exposed to prying curiosity.”162 
Close examination of the historical record also suggests that the home 
and residential privacy meant something quite different than they do 
today.163  Contrary to modern-day sentiments, the consternation over 
residential searches in the Founding Era was not about the home as a sacred 
domestic sphere or lynchpin of psychological autonomy.  Instead, concern 
focused squarely on the specific practice of customs and revenue searches 
of houses under general warrants or writs of assistance.164  Thomas Davies 
observes that the common law of the era provided sufficient protection 
against unjustified intrusion and that warrantless searches were generally 
presumed illegitimate.165  However, the common law could not adequately 
police against the risk that future legislation would make general warrants 
legal in the future.166  As William Cuddihy explains, “Open your front door, 
ran the argument, and the extent of federal invasion will be infinite.”167  
The outcry over the home, which was particularly evocative under English 
and colonial common law, was an effective strategy for attacking the 
legality of general warrants.168 
 
Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
553, 562–68 (2007); see also Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Martin (o.s.) 297, 297–98 (Orleans 1811) 
(writer of letter may enjoin its unauthorized publication or disclosure). 
 161 Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817–18 (K.B.) (quoted in Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1886)). 
 162 COOLEY, supra note 65, at 306.  In the modern day, the link between houses and papers 
is attenuated.  As Ricardo Bascuas observes, “Houses . . . are no longer the primary repository of 
the very papers and effects the Framers most sought to protect.”  Bascuas, supra note 23, at 580; 
see also Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1060 (“The dominant paradigm in search and seizure law has 
always been the ransacking of a private home, with an emphasis on rummaging around through 
the homeowner’s books and papers.”). 
 163 For example, protection of the person from privacy invasions featured prominently in 
these historical accounts.  See William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not 
His Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY 
Q. 371, 372 (1980) (describing how the Fourth Amendment was a break from, rather than an 
extension of, the English tradition of “house as castle,” which offered primarily discretionary 
protection and led to frequent intrusions on the home). 
 164 See Davies, supra note 159, at 551 (“[T]he historical concerns were almost exclusively 
about the need to ban house searches under general warrants.”). 
 165 See id. at 645–46; cf. CUDDIHY, supra note 18, at 771 (“The prevention of general 
warrants at the federal level was the preponderant motivation behind the amendment . . . .  Why 
debate probable cause for a specific warrant to search one house when a general warrant laid 
entire towns open to government purview?”); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 218 (1993) (noting that while the Framers were not 
directly concerned with warrantless searches, such searches were a matter of public concern). 
 166 See Davies, supra note 159, at 590 (arguing that, for this reason, the Framers adopted 
constitutional search and seizure provisions). 
 167 See CUDDIHY, supra note 18, at 766. 
 168 See Davies, supra note 159, at 603.  In Davies’s view, the house was important 
intrinsically as well as strategically.  He writes that even though modern cases recognize the 
unique status of the home at common law, “the rhetoric of modern doctrine falls short of 
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More broadly, scholars dispute whether the primary goal of the 
Constitution was to protect civil liberties, including privacy.  In his 
scholarship on individual liberties, G. Edward White writes that “the 
central concerns of those who had convened at Philadelphia and drafted the 
Constitution . . . were not with what modern commentators would call the 
‘civil liberties’ of Americans. . . .  They were concerned, fundamentally, 
with the allocation of sovereign powers between the states and a central 
government in America.”169  Cuddihy similarly observes that the Fourth 
Amendment “was no monument to civil libertarian altruism. . . .  Madison 
did not write the amendment because its ideas commanded constitutional 
expression but because he was under the political gun of 
Antifederalism.”170  The Framers intended the Bill of Rights to garner 
support for a federal republic.171 
Even if the historical record were to reveal home protection as a 
critical impetus for constitution-making or an exclusive stronghold of 
colonial privacy concerns, there is still reason to avoid a strict originalist 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.172  Importing the Fourth 
Amendment’s purpose to restrict general warrants in the specific historical 
context of customs and revenue searches to the modern criminal justice 
system is misguided.173  Davies explains, “Singling out and applying a 
specific common-law doctrine in a modern—that is, changed and foreign—
context will often produce results that are different from, or even 
inconsistent with, the purpose the rule served in its historical milieu.”174  
Moreover, as Tracey Maclin observes, “The reach and meaning of the 
 
recognizing the unique status accorded the house at common law.  The domicile was a sacrosanct 
interest in late eighteenth-century common law . . . .”  Id. at 642.  Accordingly, the house 
received greater legal protection than places of business and ships.  See CUDDIHY, supra note 18, 
at 770 (“[T]he dwelling house was not only the focus but a frontier of the framers’ concern with 
privacy, for they accorded places of business lesser protection from promiscuous search and 
seizure, and ships, in the Collection Act, almost none.”). 
 169 G. Edward White, Revisiting the Ideas of the Founding 12, 25 (Univ. Va. Law Sch. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 132, 2009), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1202&context=uvalwps. 
 170 CUDDIHY, supra note 18, at 770. 
 171 See White, supra note 169, at 24 (claiming that the Bill of Rights signaled the limited 
power of federal government).  The Founders were attuned to the issues of corruption and 
government tyranny but perceived that the solution lay with a central government, not scrutiny of 
civil liberties violations.  See id. at 26. 
 172 See Davies, supra note 159, at 740–41 (“Applying the original meaning of the language 
of the Fourth Amendment in a completely changed social and institutional context would subvert 
the purpose the Framers had in mind when they adopted the text.”). 
 173 But see Steinberg, supra note 159, at 74 (arguing that the eighteenth-century 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment limited its scope to unlawful house searches and also 
arguing for a return to that understanding “not because eighteenth century views on law 
enforcement are particularly relevant today. . .  [but] because we lack coherent, principled 
alternatives”). 
 174 Davies, supra note 159, at 743.  This statement is especially true given the degree of 
indeterminacy in the original Fourth Amendment.  Maclin observes that beyond the specific 
prohibition of general warrants, “the scope and meaning of the Fourth Amendment was just 
beginning to develop” in the Constitutional Era.  See Maclin, supra note 18, at 968. 
132 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol.95:xxx 
Fourth Amendment for our society should not be constrained by the 
expectations of those who lived in 1791.”175  The privacy concerns of a 
preindustrial nation, newly seceded from Britain, are not the concerns of a 
technology-rich democracy and complex criminal justice system two 
hundred years later. 
IV 
DETHRONING THE PHYSICAL HOME IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
To date, the case law and scholarship have assumed that housing 
exceptionalism affords the utmost respect to residential privacy.  One aim 
of this Article is to illustrate how reflexive protection and property-focused 
safeguards of the physical home devalue the interests at the heart of privacy 
protection.  Contrary to claims in the judicial precedents and scholarly 
literature, privacy and exclusionary control over a liberally defined home 
are not requisite to personhood, objective well-being, or, in some instances, 
subjective expectations of privacy.176  Residential search is also not 
uniquely vulnerable to government harassment nor is the home a 
particularly effective privacy stronghold against the reach of government.  
The focus on the physical home in the Fourth Amendment has in turn 
obscured the privacy harms at stake in residential search protection and 
romanticized the home into a veritable force field of domestic relations.177  
This Article proposes replacing the expansive and formalistic protection of 
the physical home, and the rhetoric surrounding residential privacy, with a 
doctrinal focus on substantive privacy and intimate association. 
A. From Iconic Property to Substantive Privacy 
In many instances, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has protected the 
physical home too expansively and categorically, often at the expense of 
substantive privacy.  Many Fourth Amendment cases, such as in the 
curtilage context, protect areas that are unlikely to implicate strong 
substantive privacy interests.  Other cases extend protection to searches of 
living spaces that do not reveal personal information or breach domestic 
life, such as certain technological scans.  At the other extreme, courts have 
allowed highly intrusive searches just outside the residential property line 
despite the high likelihood of intrusion on domestic and intimate life.178  
For example, at least one federal court of appeals has held that unaided 
eavesdropping of activity within homes and hotels from a public vantage 
point does not violate the Fourth Amendment.179  Although beyond the 
 
 175 See Maclin, supra note 18, at 971. 
 176 See supra Part II. 
 177 See supra Part I. 
 178 For example, some state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect the 
interior of residences from observation with binoculars.  See, e.g., People v. Arno, 15 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 624, 627–28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
 179 See United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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scope of this Article, substantive privacy and relational harm have also 
been given short shrift in many nonresidential contexts, such as video 
surveillance on public streets and searches of students in schools.180 
The theory of privacy advanced in this Article seeks to reorient Fourth 
Amendment residential privacy protection from the physical home to a 
stronger, more consistent doctrinal focus on substantive privacy interests.  
This proposal is not revolutionary.  Long-established precedents hold that 
“the home is sacred . . . because of . . . privacy interests in the activities that 
take place within.”181  Yet, judicial application of this principle has been 
inconsistent. 
What is substantive privacy?  Thus far, much of this Article has 
defined substantive privacy by what it is not.  It is not solicitude for the 
physical housing structure.  It is not a focus on property law.  It is not the 
precautionary extension of stringent Fourth Amendment protection to every 
residential search, regardless of the costs to criminal enforcement and 
degree of privacy harm.  Curbing such housing exceptionalism enables 
doctrines of substantive privacy and intimate association to develop in 
residential search.  A multiplicity of sources may inform the substantive 
privacy inquiry, including privacy-oriented Fourth Amendment precedents, 
concepts of privacy from common law and other legal sources, other 
constitutional provisions, public perceptions, and evidence of psychological 
or social impacts from privacy invasion.  Admittedly, the specification of 
substantive privacy in residential search is a long-term constitutional 
project, particularly given the difficulty of envisioning all present and 
future search contexts.  This Article endeavors only to sketch the broad 
parameters of substantive privacy and to offer illustrative examples of how 
this analysis can inform residential search. 
Substantive privacy in residential search addresses a constellation of 
privacy impacts.  I employ the term substantive privacy as distinct from 
 
 180 See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642–43 (2009) 
(holding that a strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl was unconstitutional because the facts of the 
case did not indicate cause for reasonable suspicion).  With respect to video surveillance, some 
local rules and state laws constrain such searches, but there is no comprehensive regulation or 
case law directly addressing what protection the Fourth Amendment grants in these situations.  In 
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), the Court was equivocal in addressing the issue of 
twenty-four-hour surveillance, noting that “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as 
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine 
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”  Id. at 284; see also Christopher 
Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 
MISS. L.J. 213, 219–33 (2002) (discussing the history, scope, and problems of closed-circuit 
television surveillance in the United States and United Kingdom). 
 181 Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984); see also Wilkins, supra note 146, at 
1111–12 (“Before Katz, the home was protected simply because it was the home . . . .  After Katz, 
the home is a protected locale, not only by virtue of its explicit mention in the language of the 
fourth amendment, but also (and perhaps primarily) because of the human activities innately 
associated with it.”).  It is also plausible to read intimate association into the language of the 
Fourth Amendment protecting the “right of the people to be secure in their persons.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. 
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substantive due process, although substantive privacy may on occasion 
overlap conceptually with areas of substantive due process protection.  A 
substantive approach to residential search addresses the disruption and 
infringement of domestic life, especially harms to intimate association.  
Substantive privacy encompasses psychological harm from privacy 
invasion; this inquiry emphasizes objective harm.  Subjective expectations 
of privacy do figure in this analysis as required under Katz and as befits the 
fact that searches perceived as extremely intrusive often correlate with 
objective harm.  However, where there is on an ex ante, categorical basis 
only a modest level of perceived intrusiveness and no evidence or reason to 
suspect objective harm, there is serious question whether the highest 
standard of probable cause Fourth Amendment protection should apply.  
Substantive privacy is also attentive to government overreaching and 
considers whether repeat or ongoing search activity creates an incipient 
threat of a police state.  By considering substantive impact, as well as the 
potential for widespread or continuous search activity, this inquiry limits 
government more effectively than housing exceptionalism’s physical 
“zone” of domestic privacy. 
Among the substantive privacy interests at issue in residential settings, 
the harm to intimate association is a critical, indeed prevailing, privacy 
interest.  Intimate association refers to interpersonal interaction and 
relationships, particularly within the context of close relationships.  Privacy 
of intimate association disregards the physical home in favor of assessing 
the likelihood that search activity will disrupt domestic life, engender 
interpersonal conflict, reveal personal information that is private to and 
constitutive of relationships, and chill socialization and intimacy.  
Psychological and sociological studies converge on interpersonal 
relationships as the reason for the significance that people attribute to the 
home.182  The strongly relational character of residential privacy parallels 
the preeminence of social relationships, not physical homes, in human 
flourishing.183  Such relationships are of critical importance to self-concept, 
intimacy and sense of belonging, social norms, and even physical health 
 
 182 See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 117, at 86 (reporting that 82 
percent of people listed an object as among their most valued possession because it reminded 
them of a close relative); GRANT MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION II: MARKETS, 
MEANING, AND BRAND MANAGEMENT 35–46 (2005) (“[O]bjects are intended to recall the 
presence of family and friendship relationships, personal achievements, family events, ritual 
passages, and community associations.”). 
 183 See John T. Cacioppo et al., Loneliness Within a Nomological Net: An Evolutionary 
Perspective, 40 J. RES. PERSONALITY 1054, 1080–82 (2006) (finding that social isolation is as 
strong a risk factor for morbidity and mortality as smoking, poor exercise, and high blood 
pressure); L. Elizabeth Crawford et al., Potential Mechanisms Through Which Loneliness Affects 
Health, 37 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY S34, S34 (Supp. 2000) (describing in abstract links between 
loneliness and poor-quality sleep and high blood pressure); Mark Snyder & Nancy Cantor, 
Understanding Personality and Social Behavior: A Functionalist Strategy, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 121, at 635, 657 (describing some benefits of intimate social 
connections). 
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and longevity.184 
A Fourth Amendment theory of privacy of intimate association 
derives principally from the precedent in Katz that reasonable expectations 
of privacy must “protect people, not places.”185  Other key Supreme Court 
precedents, particularly curtilage cases, state that protection should not 
extend to areas that “do not provide the setting for those intimate activities 
that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from government 
interference or surveillance.”186  My account of substantive privacy places 
relational harms front and center in residential search—indeed in the space 
traditionally occupied by autonomy.  This approach nonetheless safeguards 
those who eschew social life by basing Fourth Amendment protection on 
the categorical, ex ante likelihood of relational harm as well as on a more 
encompassing account of substantive privacy. 
Doctrines of substantive privacy and intimate association are not as 
clear-cut as a property line.  But, with proper doctrinal development, a 
substantive approach can provide effective guidance to police.  The 
foundation of such development is to assess individual categories of 
residential search and base protection on the ex ante likelihood of 
substantive privacy and relational harm in each context.  In the following 
subpart, I discuss illustrative examples of residential search and potential 
reforms on the basis of substantive privacy and intimate association. 
B. Revisiting the Residential Protection Default 
An approach focused on injury to substantive privacy and intimate 
association unsettles the current constitutional default.  Viewed through 
this doctrinal lens, many contexts of residential search do not warrant their 
current level of Fourth Amendment protection.  Swathes of protection 
currently afforded to sheds and garbage within residential property, for 
example, as well as from heat-sensing technology, diminish under this 
approach.  In other instances, such as physical searches of interior living 
spaces, the proxy of the home more closely tracks substantive privacy 
 
 184 See Snyder & Cantor, supra note 183, at 654; see also Setha M. Low & Irwin Altman, 
Place Attachment: A Conceptual Inquiry, in PLACE ATTACHMENT 1, 7 (Irwin Altman & Setha M. 
Low eds., 1992). 
 185 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (emphasis added).  In contrast, Thomas 
Crocker views relational privacy as a liberty interest that may be read into the Fourth Amendment 
based on the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Crocker, supra note 56, at 7–8 (“Lawrence protects 
against forms of state intrusion into a person’s home and intimate life in ways that are instructive 
for overcoming some of the worst consequences of the Fourth Amendment’s third-party 
doctrine.”). 
 186 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984); see also Segura, 468 U.S. at 810 
(stating that the need to protect the home springs from “privacy interests in the activities that take 
place within”).  In addition, the Fourth Amendment security interest may provide another basis 
for situating intimate association within the Fourth Amendment.  Jed Rubenfeld argues that the 
Fourth Amendment protects liberty within “personal life,” and presumably interpersonal life, 
from the normalizing force of an unchecked government.  See Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 127–
31. 
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interests and Fourth Amendment protection appears sensible.  Mindful of 
the need to guide police action, the Fourth Amendment reforms I describe 
in this Part employ ex ante, categorical protection based on the likelihood 
that a specific context of search will harm substantive and relational 
interests (i.e., not based on actual privacy harm to individual defendants). 
The basic project of this Article, to reorient the focus of residential 
search doctrine from the physical home to substantive privacy interests and 
intimate association, is accomplishable in a few ways.  First, we may 
conclude that certain contexts of residential search are not, as a categorical 
matter, likely to harm substantive privacy (or objectively reasonable 
subjective expectations in the language of Katz) and exclude them from 
Fourth Amendment protection.  This option has the potential to eliminate 
some of the most attenuated and questionable instances of search 
protection.  However, it may open the door to unrestrained search activity 
and provide limited options for controlling repeat searches or ongoing 
surveillance.  A second option derives from Slobogin’s proposal for a 
Fourth Amendment proportionality principle.  The proportionality principle 
enables a standard of reasonableness less than probable cause in some 
instances based on the strength of the government justification relative to 
the intrusiveness of the search.187  This proposal has interesting applications 
to the present project of calibrating search protection to substantive privacy 
harm, although the overlapping and conceptually ambiguous inquiry under 
Katz complicates the analysis.  Because the two-part test to determine 
whether an action violates the Fourth Amendment implicates 
reasonableness at both stages, substantive privacy interests may feature 
repetitively (indeed, this awkwardness may be one reason physical property 
has figured so heavily in the initial determination of Fourth Amendment 
search). 
The following sections apply a substantive privacy model, utilizing 
both traditional approaches and proportionality analysis, to the Fourth 
Amendment contexts of thermal-scanning technology, curtilage protection, 
and physical searches of the home interior. 
1. Tethering Interior Search Protection to Substantive Privacy: 
Kyllo and Technological Scanning of the Home 
The Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of technological 
invasions of the home.188  Such searches include certain kinds of visual 
surveillance, tracking devices, and thermal scans.  In United States v. Karo, 
the Court ruled that police needed a warrant to track the location of a 
beeper in private residences.189  More recently, in Kyllo v. United States, 
the Court considered whether a warrantless thermal scan that revealed heat 
 
 187 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 11, at 38–39. 
 188 In particular, the Court has had to create Fourth Amendment doctrine to govern 
technological invasions that the Wiretap Act does not regulate.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006). 
 189 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984). 
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patterns indicative of a marijuana-growing operation constituted an 
unconstitutional search.190  It held that the government conducts a Fourth 
Amendment search when it uses a device not in general public use to 
investigate the details of a home that would be unknowable absent physical 
intrusion.191  The majority opinion employed strong and decisive language 
about the preeminent importance of residential privacy, although the 
holding left open a substantial loophole for residential searches that employ 
technology that is in general use.192 
Rather than reflexively defend the home or inquire as to whether a 
technology is in general use, courts should determine whether a residential 
scan reveals details of intimate association, is likely to chill or harm 
relationships, or otherwise intrudes on the resident’s core privacy interests 
by revealing personal information.  A substantive model of privacy 
suggests that extending probable cause search protection to technology that 
does not reveal intimate, interpersonal, or personal information is 
misguided.  Prior to Kyllo, lower courts held that thermal scans and similar 
searches were too “impersonal” to warrant Fourth Amendment 
protection.193  Reorienting Fourth Amendment protection toward intimate 
association and domestic life refines these holdings and provides an ex ante 
means of differentiating between technologies that impermissibly encroach 
on privacy and those that do not.  Such encroachments include 
technological searches that are likely, as an ex ante, categorical matter, to 
chill association, hamper authenticity and spontaneity, reveal the content of 
interpersonal interaction, or otherwise expose personal or sensitive 
information.  In making this determination, courts should address the scan 
or monitoring as employed and not the potentially privacy-threatening 
aspects of the technology or undeveloped future technologies.194 
By this metric, technologies that sense heat patterns indicating plant 
growth or mere human presence do not threaten the core principles of 
intimate association and substantive privacy.195  In Kyllo, Justice Scalia 
railed that the thermal scan at issue could reveal “intimate details” such as 
what hour the “the lady of the house” takes her bath.196  In fact, the 
technology would have merely registered heat suggesting a human 
 
 190 533 U.S. 27, 29, 35–37 (2001). 
 191 See id. at 40. 
 192 See Slobogin, supra note 52, at 1393–94. 
 193 See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058–59 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 194 See Alyson L. Rosenberg, Comment, Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging: A New Weapon 
in the Fight Against Crime or a Fourth Amendment Violation?, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 135, 
138–40 (1998); see also James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth 
Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 438 (2002) (proposing that police 
investigations using technologies that enhance human sensory capabilities and threaten genuine 
interests in confidentiality are searches for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment). 
 195 Most Fourth Amendment scholars positively view the protection that Kyllo extends.  For 
a balanced assessment of the case, see Slobogin, supra note 52, at 1393–95. 
 196 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38. 
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occupant and hot water.197 
The attenuated privacy interest in protection from thermal scans 
makes this type of search one of the better candidates for reclassification as 
a non-search.  Here, substantive privacy and intimate association suggest a 
bright-line, ex ante rule excluding thermal scanning and comparable 
technologies from Fourth Amendment search.  Under Katz, there is little 
evidence that revealing heat patterns infringes upon subjective expectations 
of privacy, much less objectively reasonable expectations.198  There is 
limited propensity for psychological harm from monitoring that reveals this 
kind of impersonal physical information and specification.  Indeed, this 
information is not that different from the data utility companies gather 
regarding energy and water usage, particularly under the emerging smart-
grid systems that track consumption more precisely.199  It seems that 
individuals do not perceive this type of monitoring as an intrusion, or they 
readily habituate to ongoing collection of impersonal, physical 
information.200 
The most compelling reason to hesitate before removing thermal scans 
from Fourth Amendment protection is not the privacy interest in heat 
patterns but the potential for misuse of such technology and government 
overreaching.  Specifically, the police could employ thermal scans to 
wrongly target, harass, or discriminate or, at the other extreme, install them 
on every curbside.  However, this problem does not inevitably require a 
constitutional solution.  If wrongful or ubiquitous search becomes an issue, 
a variety of potential remedies are available, such as statutory constraints, 
 
 197 In addition, some forms of technological surveillance may enhance privacy by reducing 
the need for more intrusive physical searches of the home.  See Lee C. Milstein, Note, The 
Fortress of Solitude or Lair of Malevolence? Rethinking the Desirability of Bright-Line 
Protection of the Home, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1789, 1790–91 (2003). 
 198 Slobogin argues that the intrusiveness rankings for curtilage flyovers (ranked ten out of 
fifty items, from least intrusive to most intrusive) and binocular observation of a person in a front 
yard (ranked thirty-three out of fifty items) suggest that people view home surveillance using 
enhancement devices as more intrusive than the Supreme Court appears to believe.  See 
SLOBOGIN, supra note 11, at 69–70.  I disagree.  First, the rankings, particularly for flyovers, 
were minimal or moderate.  Second, the type of information and interaction that spying with 
binoculars potentially reveals is far more personal—and interpersonal—than a thermal scan.  
Indeed, a thermal scan revealing a grow-light system is far more similar to a curtilage flyover, 
which presumably is designed to detect illegal plant growth or other contraband, than to binocular 
spying, which implicates interpersonal interaction and domestic life.  The difference in 
intrusiveness rankings may therefore be due to the greater potential for invasion of intimate 
association and other privacy interests from binocular spying. 
 199 But see Jack I. Lerner & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Taking the “Long View” on the Fourth 
Amendment: Stored Records and the Sanctity of the Home, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 45–
46 (arguing that detailed utility information should be within the purview of the Fourth 
Amendment because it reveals private information about when a person is at home, sleeping, 
bathing, etc.). 
 200 See id.  For example, people continue to use the Internet despite the collection of 
information about their web searches, an item arguably more personal than heat patterns.  
Admittedly, many Internet items, such as breaking news, travel bookings, and blog cites, are 
difficult, even impossible in modern life, to eschew.  But even noncritical, discretionary internet 
searches do not appear to be “chilled” by personal information collection. 
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internal police rules, or liability for discriminatory search.201 
2. Correcting Overbreadth: The Example of Curtilage 
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy rights in the area surrounding 
the home from unreasonable search based on reasonable expectations of 
privacy.202  Cases have held that a variety of areas adjacent to the home, 
including gardens, garages, and mowed areas of residential lawns, are 
protected curtilage.203  In United States v. Dunn, the Supreme Court 
articulated a four-part test for determining whether an area is protected 
curtilage.204  Three of the four factors in the Dunn test reference property 
concepts: proximity to the house, enclosure, and steps taken by residents to 
secure privacy on their property.205  Only one factor, the nature of the area’s 
use, directly addresses interpersonal interests.206 
The Court’s curtilage doctrine represents a partial evolution from a 
property-oriented approach to a substantive-privacy approach that 
emphasizes intimate association.  In United States v. Oliver, the Court 
defined curtilage as “the area to which extends the intimate activity 
associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home,’” and in both Oliver and 
Dunn, the Court stated that judicial inquiry should focus on whether the 
search is likely to intrude upon intimate activities.207  Yet, the Dunn Court 
still emphasized the physical tie between the curtilage area and the home 
 
 201 Alternatively, a constitutional approach could address this problem through a reduced 
standard of reasonable suspicion (rather than probable cause) coupled with warrant substitutes to 
constrain police behavior.  Slobogin notes that in Kyllo, the fact that “‘all details are intimate 
details’ . . . does not necessarily dictate that probable cause is needed to use devices that detect 
only heat waves and do not reveal their source.”  SLOBOGIN, supra note 11, at 74–75.  Intimate 
association gives the proportionality principle an important reference point for determining the 
intrusiveness of a search.  This reference point is perhaps most useful in the context of thermal 
scans and other technological searches that only reveal physical attributes of a home. 
 202 See United States v. Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).  The curtilage doctrine derives 
from English common law extending equivalent protection to houses and outbuildings under the 
law of burglary.  See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225 (“[T]he capital house 
protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenances, if within the curtilage or homestall.”). 
 203 See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 124 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that 
backyard with “neatly mowed lawn and garden arrangements” is “clearly demarked as a 
continuation of the home itself”); United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 993 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(holding that a flower patch bordering mowed lawn 150 feet from a house is not per se outside the 
protected curtilage); Coffin v. Brandau, No. 07-cv-835, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64952, at *17–18 
(M.D. Fla. July 31, 2008) (attached garage). 
 204 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
 205 See id.  Assuming the analysis narrowly targets the property immediately surrounding the 
home, proximity to the house may indirectly implicate intimate association. 
 206 Commentators have also criticized curtilage doctrine for affording greater protection to 
rural residents than to urban or suburban dwellers.  See Brendan Peters, Note, Fourth Amendment 
Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line Rule, 56 STAN. L. REV. 943, 976–79 (2004); see also Carrie 
Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to Urban and 
Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 297, 311–19 (2005) (“Factors like proximity 
to the home or the existence of a fence make sense only in a relatively rural area.”). 
 207 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); see 
also Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300–01. 
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and accorded substantial weight to property-oriented factors and indicia of 
publicity.208  While some subsequent federal and state cases have weighed 
intimate activity in the residents’ use of the area,209 others have based their 
rulings primarily on whether the area was enclosed or within the home’s 
“mow lines.”210  A few state courts have categorically extended protection 
to open fields via state constitutional protection for possessions,211 
reinterpretation of reasonable expectations of privacy,212 and the presence 
of “No Trespassing” signs.213 
A substantive model of residential privacy calls into question the 
focus on physical property and the inconsistent judicial attention to 
intimate association and domestic life in curtilage cases.  In a postindustrial 
society, the outer yard and outbuildings are often places of attenuated 
privacy interests, particularly with respect to intimate association and 
domestic life.  For example, a physical search of shrubbery at the yard’s 
periphery, vegetable gardens, or even a garage attached to a home is 
unlikely to cause objective harm to intimate association or even create the 
highest levels of perceived intrusion upon privacy expectations.  These 
searches are also unlikely to expose details of interactions, disrupt 
relational spaces, chill socialization, or otherwise strike at the heart of 
domestic life.  In contrast, searches of decks, outdoor dining areas, 
narrowly circumscribed areas directly surrounding the home, and other 
outdoor locations commonly used for socialization are more likely to 
disrupt or chill intimate association and domestic life—a fact that argues 
against the categorical exclusion of curtilage from Fourth Amendment 
 
 208 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301–02. 
 209 See, e.g., Simko v. Town of Highlands, 276 Fed. App’x 39, 41 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding 
that the presence of an overflowing dog “‘poop pit’ strongly suggests that the area surrounding 
the shed would be unattractive to private home activities”). 
 210 See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 875 F. Supp. 108, 119 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Dunn 
factors but basing decision on the fact that officers found marijuana plants on a “groomed area” 
of the lawn despite the area’s lack of enclosure or use in domestic life); State v. Bayless, No. 92-
CA-527, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6280, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1992) (holding that seizure 
of marijuana plants on the mowed lawn between the house and garden violated rights in the 
protected curtilage); State v. Townsend, 412 S.E.2d 477, 479 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that hog 
house outside the mowed area of lawn was not within curtilage); see also Peters, supra note 206, 
at 965–73 (discussing the significance courts have attributed to “mow lines”); Rowan Themer, 
Comment, A Man’s Barn Is Not His Castle: Warrantless Searches of Structures Under the “Open 
Fields Doctrine,” 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 139, 145–48 (2008) (reviewing state and federal cases 
determining whether a search occurred in open fields or protected curtilage). 
 211 See Falkner v. State, 98 So. 691, 692 (Miss. 1924) (holding that the state constitution 
protects areas with no buildings as “possessions”). 
 212 See State v. Kirchoff, 587 A.2d 988, 994 (Vt. 1991) (holding that an owner of an open 
field has a reasonable expectation of privacy where fences or signs reasonably indicate that 
strangers are not welcome). 
 213 See State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75–76 (Mont. 1995) (interpreting the state constitution 
to mean that persons may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of land beyond the 
curtilage if they place fences, “No Trespassing” signs, or other indications that entry is 
forbidden); People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1330, 1338 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that open fields 
may fall within curtilage where landowners place fences, post “No Trespassing” signs, or 
otherwise indicate that entry is not permitted). 
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protection. 
Beginning with the most conservative option for reform, one way to 
reorient Fourth Amendment residential protection toward substantive 
privacy is to consistently and explicitly accord predominant weight to the 
third Dunn factor, the nature of the area’s use.  The focus of this inquiry 
should be whether an area is categorically likely to be used for domestic 
life (e.g., living, interacting, and socializing) as opposed to, for example, 
storage of household equipment or open space.  This is a practical revision, 
not a theoretical departure from key Court precedents, except to the extent 
that I propose weighting this factor even more strongly than most 
precedents suggest.  Another alternative, more responsive to relational 
intrusion but perhaps less so to certain nonrelational privacy interests, is to 
make the third Dunn factor, the nature of the area’s use, the exclusive 
inquiry.  This approach would employ other factors, such as proximity to 
the house, only to the extent that they inform the analysis of use and 
whether a search intrudes upon intimate association.214  To provide 
guidance to law enforcement, these reforms would utilize ex ante, 
categorical analysis of whether various areas are likely settings for intimate 
association. 
Proposals for reorienting the Dunn test more tightly around the nature 
of the area’s use are feasible, but they raise the concern of too much 
unregulated search.  An option that addresses this problem is to pair a 
modified version of the Dunn test focused on the nature of the area’s use 
with a more flexible, fine-grained approach to reasonableness balancing.  
Courts could apply reasonableness balancing in curtilage cases under a less 
strict standard than probable cause based on the strength of the underlying 
associational and other privacy interests.  This approach is not entirely 
novel in residential search and seizure cases.  A handful of cases from state 
and federal courts have suggested, indirectly or in dicta, that reasonable 
suspicion may suffice in some instances of warrantless curtilage search.215  
In the scholarly literature, Slobogin has argued persuasively for a 
proportionality principle of reasonableness that weighs the strength of the 
justification for the search against the level of intrusiveness to enable 
multiple tiers of reasonableness, including standards lower than probable 
cause.216  He grounds this proposal in the precedent of Terry v. Ohio, which 
 
 214 To better account for nonrelational harms in this scenario, a privacy-focused 
reasonableness inquiry into the search’s scope, temporal period, character, and degree of 
intrusiveness could accompany the “nature of the use” factor. 
 215 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 11, at 242 n.108 (compiling cases, including curtilage cases, 
allowing warrantless searches based on less than probable cause). 
 216 See id. at 30 (arguing that the proportionality approach responds to the “intuition, 
reflected throughout our jurisprudence, that the government’s burden should vary depending on 
the effect of its actions on the individual”).  He identifies two standards lower than probable 
cause: reasonable suspicion and relevance.  He defines reasonable suspicion as thirty percent 
certainty that criminal activity is occurring and relevance as five percent certainty that criminal 
activity is occurring.  See id. at 38–39. 
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applied the lower standard of reasonable suspicion to a stop-and-frisk 
search.217 
As applied to curtilage, a proportional or flexible approach to 
reasonableness balancing would weigh the state’s justification versus the ex 
ante, categorical likelihood of substantive privacy impact from police 
conduct, with the probable intrusion on intimate association a critical 
factor.  For example, the circumscribed area directly surrounding the house, 
decks, patios, and comparable outdoor spaces could retain traditional 
probable cause protection based on the likely impact of such searches on 
intimate association and domestic life.  Areas of curtilage less likely to be 
implicated in intimate life, such as storage outbuildings, garages, and 
garbage within the curtilage could be subject to a reduced standard of 
reasonable suspicion.218  Spaces that are unlikely to implicate substantive 
privacy or intimate association interests, such as outlying gardens or dog 
houses, could be subject to a low standard such as relevance or excluded 
altogether from Fourth Amendment protection.219 
This description is a preliminary sketch of the contours of a revised 
curtilage doctrine; development of curtilage subtypes and accompanying 
standards of protection will proceed best over time and in the context of 
judicial precedent.  In certain cases, a reasonableness balancing approach 
will entail at least initial uncertainty as to the applicable standard for 
intermediate or mixed-use areas.  In light of the exclusionary rule, police 
may opt for caution in ambiguous cases and secure traditional warrant 
protection (a process that can often be accomplished expeditiously).  This 
is not a bad result.  Notably, similar uncertainty exists in the present 
doctrine, particularly as it is implemented by the lower courts: there is 
currently significant ambiguity for law enforcement as to whether areas are 
protected curtilage or unprotected open fields.   
Although the proposals discussed in this section may appear to 
radically revise the law, in fact the case law reveals increasing judicial 
ambivalence toward the curtilage doctrine.  For example, there is limited 
protection for arrest within the curtilage; thresholds of homes are 
 
 217 Id. at 30. 
 218 See id. at 108–15 (referencing empirical study of levels of perceived intrusiveness). 
 219 Slobogin proposes that search and seizure doctrine encompass all government action that 
constitutes a search for evidence, including countless areas now excluded, and that warrants or 
warrant substitutes apply in all cases absent exigency.  See id. at 45–47.  In the residential search 
context, this Article’s depiction of the inefficiency and intransigence of the iconic home may 
suggest less dramatic reform.  Retaining some form of the Dunn test but enabling some searchers 
with less than probable cause is a more incremental, and thus more palatable, reform.  
Categorically excluding some government action on curtilage as a non-search based on attenuated 
relational and other privacy interests may allow more efficient sifting and use of judicial 
resources.  Similarly, requiring a warrant or warrant substitute for all curtilage searches may not 
be cost effective.  From the perspective of resource conservation, the Supreme Court should not 
foreclose the possibility that some instances of residential search will qualify as searches and 
meet a proportional balancing test, perhaps under the lowest relevance standard, but do not 
require ex ante review in the form of a warrant substitute. 
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considered public places for the purpose of arrest.220  Courts do not appear 
hesitant to hold that outdoor areas are open fields rather than protected 
curtilage, and following California v. Ciraolo, the Fourth Amendment no 
longer protects curtilage from aerial surveillance.221  An increasing number 
of circuits have opted to review curtilage determinations de novo rather 
than apply the clear error standard.222  The narrowing of curtilage 
protection and the suggestion in a handful of cases that less than probable 
cause may be acceptable in curtilage searches hints that some of the 
reforms described in this section may be quietly beginning.223 
3. The Home as a Proxy: Interior Physical Searches 
The physical home has doctrinal value in selective contexts as a proxy 
for substantive privacy and privacy of intimate association.  Homes are 
important to privacy and personhood not because homes symbolize 
intimate ties but because they so frequently shelter them.  The home serves 
as the “stage” for household life and a variety of social relationships.224  An 
array of interpersonal processes takes place in the home including “social 
and cultural norms and rules, affective, emotional, and evaluative bonds, 
and cultural rituals and practices.”225  Psychological and sociological 
studies converge on interpersonal relationships as the reason for the 
significance that people attribute to their homes.226  Fourth Amendment 
protection should derive from the parameters of the physical home only 
where they are, as a categorical matter, a reasonably accurate proxy for 
substantive interests. 
Physical searches that intrude on interior residential living spaces, or 
the “seat of family life,” entail a high risk of substantive privacy harm.227  
 
 220 See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976). 
 221 See 476 U.S. 207, 210 (1986). 
 222 See Jake Linford, Comment, The Right Ones for the Job: Divining the Correct Standard 
of Review for Curtilage Determinations in the Aftermath of Ornelas v. United States, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 885, 886–87 (2008). 
 223 See supra note 215. 
 224 See Irwin Altman, Toward a Transactional Perspective: A Personal Journey, in 
ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR STUDIES: EMERGENCE OF INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS 225, 240 
(Irwin Altman & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1990) (“[I]mportant human relationships occur in 
homes, including intimate social bonds and all manner of family relationships.”); see also 
CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 117, at 121–24 (“[A] home is much 
more than a shelter; it is a world in which a person can create a material environment that 
embodies what he or she considers significant.”); MCCRACKEN, supra note 182, at 35 (observing 
that the home and its unique objects have “the effect of deeply personalizing the present 
circumstances”). 
 225 Werner et al., supra note 113, at 1, 3. 
 226 See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 117, at 86 (reporting that 82 
percent of people listed an object as among their most valued because it reminded them of a close 
relative); MCCRACKEN, supra note 182, at 35–46 (noting role in domestic life of “objects [that] 
are intended to recall the presence of family and friendship relationships, personal achievements, 
family events, ritual passages, and community associations”). 
 227 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961). 
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People perceive searches of residential interiors, particularly bedrooms, as 
more intrusive than other forms of residential search.228  This finding is 
hardly surprising.  Extensive physical searches of home interiors inflict 
objective harm by engendering fear, suspicion, and blame as government 
officers invade living spaces and frequently damage possessions.  
Cohabitants may feel that the suspect has brought this invasion upon them, 
and the criminal investigation is likely to raise questions or suspicions 
about the suspect’s character and behavior, even if the suspect is innocent. 
Interior or extensive residential searches also inflict harm by 
interrupting domestic life.  Search activity halts the conversations, 
interactions, and domestic activities that are the foundation of interpersonal 
relationships and does so most severely when the search is prolonged or 
repetitious.  Physical searches for contraband or evidence can also be quite 
destructive of living spaces.  These searches not only disturb the suspect 
and any cohabitants but also disrupt (and even destroy) core living areas.  
The disruption of relational spaces in the home and the potential exposure 
of private items to social intimates create a high risk of privacy harm.229  
Admittedly, these dynamics may occur in curtilage and other less intrusive 
residential searches, but they are typically less severe.230 
The likelihood of harm to domestic life and intimate association 
merits the retention of traditional probable cause and warrant protection for 
physical searches of home interiors.  By home interior, I mean the rooms 
inside the house rather than attached sheds or garages.  The strong privacy 
and relational interest in such spaces may also counsel removing some of 
the established exceptions that apply to physical searches of home interiors.  
For example, an analytical focus on substantive privacy and relational harm 
suggests eliminating or restricting exceptions based on third-party, 
cohabitants’ consent to residential search of home interiors.231  As with the 
 
 228 See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text. 
 229 Contrary to popular intuition, the fact that police see or handle personal items is a lesser 
consequence of house search.  Police are generally strangers, and our self-presentation and 
interpersonal concerns before them are highly attenuated.  If the concern is that police will 
discuss private information or embarrassing activities not the subject of the crime with other 
community members, an internal rule prohibiting disclosure to a community member or tort 
liability for any such disclosure can address this problem.  For a discussion of the problem of use 
of private information discovered in criminal search, see Krent, supra note 150, at 51 (arguing 
that seized property should be subject to “use restrictions . . . confining the governmental 
authorities to uses consistent with the [Fourth] Amendment’s reasonableness requirement”). 
 230 Another example of a doctrine that promotes interpersonal conflict within the home is 
third-party consent, which enables a third party with common authority to consent to search.  See 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).  In recent scholarship, Thomas Crocker has 
argued persuasively that this doctrine forces the suspect to assume the risk of interpersonal 
sharing.  See Crocker, supra note 56, at 48–49. 
 231 Traditionally, third-party consent cases have focused on a cohabitant’s apparent authority 
to consent to police trespass and search rather than on substantive privacy and relational harm.  In 
a substantive privacy framework with intimate association as a key concern, it is clear that 
consent does not obviate the risk of relational harm from the search with respect to the defendant 
and other cohabitants or visitors.  Also, the assumption in the literature is that a cohabitant who 
consents has signaled the end of the relationship.  The evidence belies this assumption and 
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other reforms I discuss, the protection of privacy in home interiors via 
probable cause and warrants for physical search should be ex ante and 
categorical.  This example of physical searches of interior living spaces 
illustrates how substantive privacy and intimate association can yield clear 
rules to guide police action.  As a result, a home interior search will on 
occasion receive robust protection despite the fact that the search does not 
harm substantive privacy and intimate association interests of the specific 
defendant and cohabitants.  On balance, the benefits of providing guidance 
to law enforcement outweigh these costs. 
Proponents of strong privacy protection may be reluctant to 
distinguish physical (or comparably intrusive technological) searches of 
home interiors from less intrusive residential searches.  Scholars have 
argued that broadly protecting property affords stronger privacy protection 
than the Katz reasonable expectations test.232  Others claim that if 
protection of intimate life is a vital interest, then it deserves the most 
stringent and precautionary form of privacy protection.  By this reasoning, 
the categorical protection of the home and its environs from all forms of 
government intrusion enables intimate relations to develop free from 
government interference.233  This approach, however, resurrects housing 
exceptionalism with all of its attendant costs to doctrinal efficiency and law 
enforcement.  Requiring probable cause and warrant protection for every 
context of residential search (a standard higher than the Supreme Court’s 
current approach) would hinder criminal law enforcement, undermine 
public support for privacy protection, and increase pressure on the judiciary 
to carve exceptions from residential search protection.  Consequently, the 
approach I advocate tailors protection more narrowly to intimate life. 
V 
REVISING THE THEORY OF THE INVIOLATE HOME: OBJECTIONS AND 
 
seriously calls into question whether an ex ante, categorical approach to home interior search 
should recognize third-party consent.  In light of the evidence that many third-party consenters do 
not understand that they are consenting, that they are free to withdraw consent, or the 
ramifications of their consent, there is a significant likelihood that consent will damage a viable 
relationship between the defendant and consenting cohabitant.  See, e.g., Dorothy K. Kagehiro et 
al., Perceived Voluntariness of Consent to Warrantless Police Searches, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 38, 46–47 (2006) (finding significant actor (third party) and observer (court) 
differences in perceptions of the perceived voluntariness of consent and the ramifications of legal 
consent).  In addition, a substantive approach, by redirecting the inquiry to privacy harm, raises 
the question of whether the type of residential search, and its invasiveness, should matter to third-
party consent cases. 
 232 See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: 
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 
1364 (2004) (“Instead of protecting individual expectations of privacy directly, courts might best 
protect privacy in public life indirectly by identifying and protecting those features of our society, 
including those features of public space, that allow anonymity and other privacy-related interests 
to exist in sufficient measure.”); see also Bascuas, supra note 23, at 579, 626–28 (advocating that 
Fourth Amendment doctrine abandon the direct protection of privacy and instead protect 
property, broadly and pragmatically defined). 
 233 I thank Tommy Crocker for his comments on this point. 
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CONSIDERATIONS 
Removing residential privacy rights protection from its hallowed and 
long-standing position of privilege represents an upheaval of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.  This Part responds to concerns and objections to 
revising the protection of privacy rights in the home.  Specifically, I 
consider the security interest in the Fourth Amendment, the problem of 
repeat search, and social norms of privacy. 
A. Security and Other Privacy Interests 
One objection to my account is that criminal search protection is not 
about privacy, relational or otherwise, but about the right to security or 
other interests.234  In Minnesota v. Carter, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote 
that the protection the home receives under the Fourth Amendment has 
“acquired over time a power and an independent significance justifying a 
more general assurance of personal security in one’s home, an assurance 
which has become part of our constitutional tradition.”235  Jed Rubenfeld 
has described this concept as the right to be let alone from the progressively 
normalizing force of the government.236  He has advocated replacing the 
current doctrinal focus on privacy with a reinvigorated notion of security.237 
To the extent that housing exceptionalism is based on psychological 
and political rationales that falter upon closer examination, a new 
foundation for protection is necessary.  The conceptualization of the Fourth 
Amendment security interest, however, does not presently offer a 
sufficiently firm and articulated ground.  First, the interest in security is 
quite vague.  It is not clear how it differs from the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence or the scholarship on privacy.  Second, security presumably 
dovetails to some degree with the principle of intimate association.  A 
principal impetus of our desire for security is to enable interpersonal 
sharing and social life.238  Revising housing exceptionalism promotes 
security, and other liberties, by refocusing the Fourth Amendment on the 
substantive interests at stake in residential search.  With respect to interests 
other than security, I acknowledge that there may be reasons for affording 
protection to homes other than the rationales explored in this Article.  
When autonomy or other privacy interests are at issue, however, most of 
the proposals in this Article can accommodate those interests. 
B. Repeat Searches and Ubiquitous Monitoring 
One concern of more narrowly targeting residential privacy protection 
 
 234 Commentators have noted “the difficulties in predicating constitutional protection on 
anything so abstract and manipulable as privacy.”  Bascuas, supra note 23, at 580. 
 235 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 100 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 236 See Rubenfeld, supra note 127, at 784. 
 237 See Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 161. 
 238 See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483–84 (1968). 
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is that citizens may be subject to repeat searches or widespread monitoring.  
This Article has primarily contemplated discrete instances of search.  
Indisputably, a search that does not extensively interfere with substantive 
privacy or intimate association may eventually do so if it is repetitious.  For 
example, a one-time or occasional inspection of certain kinds of curtilage 
poses limited substantive harm to interpersonal life; repeat inspections 
occurring over an extended period are a different matter.239  Harm occurs 
because of the cumulative impact of the privacy invasion, as well as the 
experience of prolonged loss of control. 
This danger is especially pervasive in technological searches because 
of the capacity for continuous and widespread surveillance.  There are a 
variety of options to address this problem.  Search warrants or search-
warrant substitutes provide an important measure of protection against 
repeat searches and ubiquitous surveillance.  Statutes and internal police 
rules can also address repeat searches and prevent the development of a 
“police state.” 
With respect to physical searches of curtilage and other residential 
spaces, internal checks on repeat searches are available.  Law enforcement 
has limited resources.240  Police lack the time and resources necessary to 
repeatedly search a large number of geographically dispersed residences (as 
opposed to central streets and thoroughfares).  This constrains, but does not 
eliminate, the repeat-search problem.  As with technology, legal constraints 
and remedies can address repeat searches.  A revised Fourth Amendment 
approach to residential search could, for example, extend heightened 
protection to repeat searches by requiring a warrant or higher standard of 
cause following the initial search.  Statutes, internal rules, and a cause of 
action against police for search action that rises to the level of harassment 
are other possible sources of redress.241 
C. Social Norms of Privacy 
If people believe homes should be inviolate, then shouldn’t the Fourth 
Amendment reflect this belief?  In other words, has my account neglected 
the proper role of subjective perceptions and social norms in defining 
privacy law?  My response to this concern is twofold.  First, the physical 
home is an imperfect proxy for what people find most meaningful about 
domestic spaces.  The strongest focus of public consternation about 
 
 239 Cf. Tracey Maclin, Police Interrogation During Traffic Stops: More Questions Than 
Answers, 31 CHAMPION 34, 34–36 (2007) (describing precedents allowing police to stop and 
question motorists about subjects unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop). 
 240 See, e.g., Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far?, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1199 (2001) (describing limited police resources as one justification for 
eschewing strong prohibitions on deception in interrogation). 
 241 For members of protected classes, state prohibitions against discrimination and the 
availability of federal Section 1983 actions to redress discrimination and other constitutional 
violations may also protect against repeat search that rises to the level of discrimination or 
harassment.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 14141 (2006). 
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residential privacy is presumably on incursions that reveal intimate 
associations and activities.242  The available empirical evidence does not 
test this directly, but Slobogin and Schumacher’s findings are broadly 
consistent with the notion that residential searches that expose, harm, or 
even symbolize intimate association, such as searches of bedrooms or home 
interiors, are considered the most intrusive.243 
Second, the Katz test requires the Court to consider subjective 
expectations of privacy that “society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”244  An analysis focused exclusively on majoritarian views 
founders on the circularity between law and privacy norms and 
disadvantages minority interests and emerging technologies.  Objective 
reasonableness must also be a factor.  The limited research to date suggests 
modest effects from discrete physical invasions of spaces, particularly 
when relational harm is not at issue, and less harm from the exposure of 
possessions or embarrassing items to law enforcement than to intimates.245  
There is not a strong basis in law or other evidence to conclude that 
housing exceptionalism meaningfully safeguards against privacy harm. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment has disproportionately protected residential 
privacy rights on the basis of property-law concepts and the rhetoric of the 
inviolate physical home.  Housing exceptionalism has decreased the 
coherence and efficiency of the Fourth Amendment and derailed doctrine 
from the goal of protecting citizens from substantive privacy harm.  
Contrary to the current understanding of Fourth Amendment doctrine, the 
privileging of the home within criminal search is not a principled response 
to psychological and political exigency or original intent.  I advocate 
replacing housing exceptionalism and formalist property approaches with a 
strong and consistent doctrinal focus on harm to substantive privacy and 
intimate association.   
 
 242 See ALTMAN, supra note 103, at 22 (“Privacy is usually an interpersonal event . . . .”). 
 243 See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 16, at 738–39 tbl.1. 
 244 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 245 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.  Prioritizing intimate association over 
protection of the physical home is also consistent with the psychology literature conceptualizing 
privacy as interaction management.  See Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 91, at 33. 
